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ABSTRACT

Originally presented as lectures at Georgia State University in 1982, these three papers address the themes of multiethnic societies in the United States and Great Britain. In the first paper "Identity, Conflict, and Survival Mechanisms for Asian Americans," the author discusses how the observable patterns of mobility through education and community development are consequences of meaningful action and interaction among millions of Asian Americans over time. Cultural identity and the process of assimilation of Caribbean Americans is the focus of the second paper. The barriers to assimilation faced by many Caribbean migrants have caused many of them to question the viability of this goal and to turn to ethnic bargaining as a way of competing for political strength and survival in the United States. The third paper examines British racial and educational policies in the 1960s and 1970s. The evolution of Britain into a multiracial society has been marked by ambiguity in policy that has been both welcoming and resistant (and sometimes racist). British education has, most of the time, paid lip service to the goals of multiracism, while being less than positive in its pursuit. (RM)

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DIFFERENT PEOPLE:

Studies in Ethnicity and Education

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Introduction

Edgar B. Gumbert

I

The papers included in this volume were originally presented as lectures at Georgia State University in April and May 1982. They were the second set of lectures given in the Visiting Scholar Lecture Series sponsored annually by the Center for Cross-cultural Education and the College of Education. The first set of lectures by Harold Silver, Michael F.D. Young, and Edgar Z. Friedenberg was published by Georgia State University in 1981 under the title of *Poverty, Power, and Authority in Education: Cross-cultural Perspectives.*

The lectures given by Lung-chang Young and John Raynor have been only slightly revised for publication; the lecture given by Helen Safa has been considerably extended.

The speakers were asked to address the themes of multiethnic societies and multicultural education broadly conceived. The speakers were chosen because of their notable contributions in their respective fields. The themes were chosen for their theoretical and practical importance. The growing field of ethnic studies has many methodological and substantive gaps to be filled. Minority communities are conspicuously establishing themselves today in many areas

of the world where formerly there were scarcely any. Political and educational authorities suddenly have been asked to attend to the wants and needs of peoples of many different colors, languages, and cultures. Few of them were well equipped by training or experience to solve the problems with which they now are faced.

Cross-cultural misconceptions and misjudgments abound. Sometimes the misconceptions are expressed humorously, as by Hilaire Belloc in "The Three Races," from his volume *Cautionary Verses:*

I

Behold, my child,
the Nordic Man
And be as like
him as you can.
His legs are long;
his mind is slow;
His hair is lank
and made of tow.

II

And here we have the Alpine Race.
Oh! What a broad and foolish face!
His skin is of a dirty yellow,
He is a most unpleasant fellow.

III

The most degraded of them all
Mediterranean we call.
His hair is crisp, and even curls,
And he is saucy with the girls.

Sometimes the misjudgments are fatal, as in the case of a 32-year-old man in Miami, Florida, who in April 1982 was shot in the back of the head with a shotgun after he insulted a restaurant waitress for not speaking English.

Many obstacles stand in the way of making multiethnic societies work humanely and fairly. Increased knowledge and understanding should help overcome them all.

Obviously the ethnic composition and educational policies of many nations could have been included in this volume. But the ones that are included enable us to compare and contrast groups within the United States and abroad.

From the apparent diversity, similarities and regularities

emerge from which it is possible to infer concepts and strategies that can be applied to a variety of cultural and educational settings.

II

The movement of millions of people around the world today constitutes one of the greatest population shifts in history. Uprooted by wars and revolutions and driven by stark poverty and political persecution, these people move in the hope of finding economic security and political freedom. They carry with them their own pasts, and their own moral, intellectual and cultural universes that often are strikingly different from the ones they encounter in the receiving countries. While their presence frequently enriches the host countries, their sometimes alien and little known ways of life also produce fear and hostility.

The countries of Western Europe and North America have been the ones most influenced by the migration of people since World War II, and in virtually all of them a political and educational debate centering on the issues of cultural cohesion and the correct national response to ethnic minorities is taking place.

The ethnic phenomenon is diverse. The elements typically used to define an ethnic group, either individually or together, are common ancestry, shared territory and historical past, and a focus on such features as religion, sect, language, dialect, tribal affiliation, nationality, and color. Virtually every nation in the world has at least one ethnic minority, and many nations have several. Some ethnic minorities are old (blacks in the United States) while others are new (blacks in Britain). Moreover, common language, color, religion or attachment to the same national symbols and institutions do not guarantee a group against being an outsider. For example, the over one million *pieds noirs* who entered France from Algeria after it gained its independence in 1962 were as despised then by the metropolitan French as the Algerian or Moroccan immigrant workers who came later.

The main issue in the current debate is the relationship between the dominant and the minority groups, each of which is an ethnic group. The central point of interest between the two groups is integration, described by R.A.

Schermerhorn in *Comparative Ethnic Relations* as "a process whereby units or elements of a society are brought into an active and coordinated compliance with the ongoing activities and objectives of the dominant group." The modes of integration can vary in different societies depending on the extent of the acceptance by the minority of the dominant language, values, and behavior and of the acceptance of the minority into the decision-making structures of the dominant group. This distinction between cultural and structural inclusion, made by Milton Gordon in *Assimilation in American Life* and employed to great advantage by both Young and Safa in this volume, draws attention to several forms of integration, each with different degrees of cultural value acceptance and of structural participation. *Assimilation* is the form with the greatest congruity between dominant and minority groups; the minorities are thoroughly absorbed into the dominant culture and structures (some but not all immigrant groups in the United States). *Cultural pluralism* is a form of integration in which there is a weak-to-moderate accord between dominant and minority culture but generally open access to decision-making structures (the United States, especially since the 1960s). *Separatism* as a form of integration can be either voluntary or coerced. Voluntary separatism occurs when both the dominant and the minority groups agree to exist side by side but with their own cultural and structural patterns. (Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, and the preferred form of integration of many recent Caribbean migrants in the United States and of many Quebecois in Canada). Coerced separatism occurs when the minority group wants either assimilation or cultural pluralism and the dominant group does not (South Africa, where the dominant group is a numerical minority, and blacks in the United States before the 1960s). *Colonialism* exists when the minority prefers separation and the dominant group wants assimilation and can occur either inside or outside a nation's borders (the former European empires, and the Mayan Indians in Mexico today). Slightly different typologies are used by Safa and Raynor in this volume.

To oversimplify the debate, the two extremes are assimilation and pluralism of some kind, including in this restricted sense voluntary separatism. The view of the assimilationists is that a civil and supportive human community cannot exist without a set of moral and social rules to

which all of the members of the community must subscribe. The assimilationists' measure of a worthy social life is the extent to which the interests of a group are shared by all of its members, although these points of shared common interests may be numerous and varied. Not all diversity is healthy, they say, and they foresee the disintegration of a coherent national culture (which they frequently equate with the culture of the dominant group) if it is not given priority over individual and ethnic self-expression. They prefer that the state take the lead in providing the people with a set of consistent and unitary concepts by which to live.

Pluralists deny that the good life can be derived from only one set of norms and institutions. There are, they say, radically different choices in the political, economic, social, and cultural domains, and democratic societies must condone variety. In fact, they hold that the acceptance of diversity itself constitutes a common ethos and is a test of democratic virtue. Pluralists believe that the modern state is unfit to act as a cultural arbiter and educator of the whole community. Since the modern secular state typically denies the existence of any fixed principles of correct conduct, there are no compelling standards to which it can appeal to assure compliance to its rules. In the absence of national state standards—other than instrumental ones such as efficiency, rationality, and order—pluralists prefer to give their loyalty to smaller communities that have stronger and more sustaining standards. Their "homeland" is in the local community.

Both the assimilationists and the pluralists presuppose a particular kind of society, and both strive in a recognizable way to embody their intentions in appropriate norms and institutions.

The modes of integration employed by different countries are influenced by unique sets of economic, political, social, and cultural interests. Power and authority relations are essential considerations. The type of integration that is achieved reflects pressures from both the dominant and the minority groups. The most important factors that affect ethnic interaction—generally agreed on by the three contributors to this volume—are the political and economic contexts within which the interaction occurs, the size and composition of the minority ethnic group, its length of time

in the country, its concentration in a geographic area, the size of the dominant group, and the quality of its values and structures. The influence of these factors varies with time and place, as is amply illustrated by the papers in this volume.

Educational and other public authorities must confront these contextual differences and take them into account as they try to formulate tenable educational policies. Policies regarding such matters as minority control of school operations and the extent to which school policies attempt to inhibit or enhance ethnic identity will vary as the larger context in which they operate changes.

III

The general context within which the contemporary debates are taking place is fairly well known and is broadly the same in Europe and the United States. Many structural similarities exist among advanced industrial nations, and these have produced problems and responses to them that are very similar, regardless of historical, social, cultural, and political differences. The reader of the papers in this volume will be struck by cross-national similarities between England and the United States and cross-cultural parallels among ethnic groups within the United States.

During the two decades following World War II, Western Europe and the United States enjoyed an almost unprecedented economic growth and development. In Europe, migrants from the poorer countries in the south provided the dirty and hard industrial labor on which the growth depended. In the United States the poor, blacks, and immigrants (legal and illegal) labored willingly at the unappealing tasks that neither the native nor the naturalized Americans wanted to do.

There are an estimated 10 to 14 million foreign workers in industrial Western Europe today, a figure that becomes much larger when dependents and illegal immigrants are added. Germany alone has approximately 4.65 million foreign workers, including 15 percent of Yugoslavia's labor force. One out of every 6 workers in Western Europe is a foreigner. This movement of postwar migration from south to north Europe accounts for the greatest uprooting in Europe since the exodus to the United States in the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In the United States there are approximately 6 to 14 million undocumented foreign workers today, and more millions who are documented and legal.

The foreign workers in Europe go by different names: *les émigrés* and *les déracinés* in France; *gastarbeiter* in Germany; *invandrare* in Sweden. But they all share the condition of not being immigrants—of not settling down in a new country (although as Raynor shows many have settled in England)—but of being temporary workers doing grueling work and of being driven to it by poverty or by racial and political persecution in their home countries. They are neither quite immigrants nor settlers nor guests. They have been uprooted from their natural communities and thrust into alien, sometimes hostile settings. They survive at a social and cultural distance from the life of the host country around them. In fact they are judged by the distance they keep from the host culture. In their minds they live "at home." Although they have achieved a modest amount of financial success and can send remittances to their families at home, they are adrift without supportive connection to nation, place, or custom.

Increasingly, they are also without importance. By the late 1960s economic growth in Europe was inflationary. By the 1970s the oil crisis and world recession meant that Western Europe could not look forward to the same rate of economic growth it had had in the 1950s and 1960s.

With tight money, scarce jobs, and no end to the recession in view, migrant workers were the first to suffer. A backlash is now officially respectable among governments that formerly took credit for growth and prosperity built on migrant labor. In the 1960s migrant laborers were welcomed to jobs nobody wanted. By the mid-1970s they were accused of taking jobs from host nationals. Thousands of migrant workers have been laid off and most of them are faced with the choice between staying abroad or returning to countries where they also will not be able to find jobs.

Sweden banned the importation of additional foreign labor in 1972, Germany in 1973, and France in 1974. Also in 1974 more than one-third of the voters in Switzerland in a special national referendum were in favor of a deportation plan for foreign workers. In 1982 Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reaffirmed the German policy when he said "4

million is enough. We're not a job-placement agency for the entire world."

Nevertheless many of the 'guests" have stayed beyond their welcome. The "temporary" workers recruited in the 1960s have formed permanent settlements and have become what some observers call a "permanent underclass."

In Britain the Empire is the central historical fact that must be reckoned with in studying ethnic matters. After World War II immigrants from the colonies or former colonies entered Britain to fill jobs that were going begging. Most of them were from the "New Commonwealth," an official euphemism for "coloured," and according to the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys the total number of nonwhites (blacks and Asians) reached 2.2 million in 1981 or 4.1 percent of the total population of Britain. This is a small figure by American measures but as recently as the late 1960s the proportion of nonwhites was only 2 percent. Thus, within a very short period of time Britain has gone from being almost entirely white to being a multiracial society. Although their numbers are small, the non-white minorities are very visible, and their presence is exaggerated because they are concentrated in certain areas in large cities. This growing and concentrated presence has generated deep misunderstanding, suspicion, bitterness, and occasional clashes between blacks and whites.

Many whites in Britain complain today that they never voted to make Britain multiracial, but the "New Commonwealth" immigrants point out that "We are here because you were there." The Empire that was once a source of pride has now become an unwanted burden.

The Empire contributed in another important way to contemporary issues. Britain for a century or more controlled the lives and destinies of millions of Africans and Asians, and it is still common for many Britons to assume automatically a position of superiority toward people from the New Commonwealth, whether based on race or not.

Since official Britain lumps Asians and Africans together as "coloureds," and people from both continents are "simply treated differently"—a view on which blacks and whites concur—some of the militants of Asian descent use the term black to describe themselves. A native of Sri Lanka recently said: "The old-style Asians used to go along with the white British view in which we were a couple of notches above the

black people from Africa and the Caribbean. But we have come to realize that was just a divide-and-conquer tactic. We must all stand together as blacks."

Many Britons still consider the matter of a multiracial society to be simply an immigration problem, as Raynor suggests. Immigration was vividly identified as a political issue as early as 1968 when Enoch Powell, at the time a member of the Conservative shadow cabinet, predicted "a river foaming with blood" unless Britain curbed immigration. Eleven years later, shortly before her election in 1979 as Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher in a now-famous address claimed that "They've [white people] seen the whole character of their neighborhood change. They feel their whole way of life has been changed. Small minorities can be absorbed; they can be assets to the majority community. But once a minority in a neighborhood gets very large, people do feel swamped." A Gallup poll reported that two-thirds of the population agreed with her.

But immigration is no longer a problem. It has all but stopped, yet multiracialism continues; 40 percent of the blacks and Asians now in Britain were born there. And they have learned, as their parents in the Empire or the Commonwealth before them had learned, to think of England as their mother country and to expect that the principles of democracy and social justice will be honored. This expectation was expressed in 1979 in Bristol after a confrontation between white policemen and angry blacks. A black resident of the neighborhood in which the event occurred said the looting and burning and attacks on policemen were "really about jobs, about racial prejudice and police beatings, about schools, housing and our right to our share. We demand it." The substance and the tone are familiar to Americans.

So many nations today use political boundaries as barriers to mobility that it is easy to forget that it is a relatively recent practice. Before World War I it was possible to move around Europe without a passport. The United States did not require visas of foreign visitors until 1915. Early in the century Mexican immigrants could also enter the United States with no more formal requirement than the payment of fifty cents.

However, by 1924, Congress, amid outcries about a "yellow peril" (that began in the nineteenth century), passed the Alien Quota Act that all but excluded Asians from the

United States by setting numerical quotas restricting immigration almost exclusively to Europeans. Invidious distinctions were also made between immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and those from northern and western Europe, the latter set being preferred.

It should be remarked, however that in 1965 Congress repealed the 1924 law and abolished racial quotas. Asians then faced the same restrictions as immigrants from elsewhere—20,000 from each country annually, with an overall limit each year from all countries of 270,000. In 1981 Congress voted to give mainland China its own quota of 20,000 immigrants a year, while retaining the quota from Taiwan, thus giving the Chinese a combined total of 40,000. Moreover, after the fall of the South Vietnamese government in 1975, the United States agreed to take refugees from southeast Asia, and by 1980 had taken in almost .5 million from Indochina. The total number of Asians in the United States in 1980 was more than 3.5 million. Dominant groups in the United States responded differently to each group of Asian immigrants, and each Asian group responded differently to the United States, as Young makes clear.

To the traditional concern over Asians was added the alarm over Hispanics, beginning in the 1940s and 1950s when the economic disparities and differences in quality of life between the United States and Mexico widened. (The same could be said for Puerto Rico, but its status as an American dependency alters the political and legal aspects of immigration.) The pressures for Mexicans to move to the United States both then and now seem irresistible. The border between the United States and Mexico is perhaps the only international frontier in the world that separates a largely impoverished nation from a highly developed one. By the middle of the 1970s the average per capita income in the United States was eight times that of Mexico. One-half of Mexico's labor force is unemployed or underemployed. For the Mexican worker the only practical hope is north of the border where there is a promise of a fresh start. Although they are "fearful half-persons" who are cheated by store owners, exploited by landlords, and unable to claim many of the services their taxes help support, as Safa shows, they can earn a year's wages in six and a half weeks, so they will continue to come and will suffer their indignities silently in order to get the money.

The Census Bureau estimates that there are now 14.6 million Hispanics in the United States, 8.7 million from Mexico alone. Leaders of the Hispanic communities put the total as high as 20 million, and with a growth rate of 2.2 percent a year it is the fastest growing minority in the country. Some Americans fear that this internal growth, together with increased illegal Hispanic immigration, will lead to a drift toward a separate Spanish minority and will end in a condition similar to the one that English-speaking Canada has with the French-speaking minority in Quebec province—unless Hispanic children are required to learn English. Other Americans argue that the illegal Hispanic immigrants, many of whom are unskilled and illiterate even in their own language, as Safa states, will add to the already large underclass, mostly black, in inner-city ghettos. Still others accuse them of taking jobs from Americans and of taxing social services.

Students of immigration point out that since many Hispanics are "colored" they form a "caste minority group," as distinct from an "immigrant minority group," to use a distinction John Ogbu makes in *Minority Education and Caste;* therefore they are less likely to be structurally accepted, even if they are culturally accepted. Race, along with education and occupation, is linked to class, status, and power. Safa discloses, for example, that black Cubans are less accepted than white Cubans, and laborers less than professionals.

Clare Boothe Luce, former United States congresswoman and ambassador to Italy, summarized the concerns of many Americans in 1982 when she said that unless the influx of aliens is stopped "there are bound to be dreadful clashes within our society." Using imagery as vivid as that of Enoch Powell and Margaret Thatcher, she claimed the United States faced a greater threat from invading aliens than from the atomic bomb.

American sympathy for immigrants has been strained, even though the United States built itself on immigration. "We have got to control our borders" is a statement supported by millions of Americans. They see immigration as a threat to the nation culturally, morally, socially, politically, and economically. Yet the leaders of both major political parties acknowledge that immigration is out of control. The Census Bureau estimates that there are between 1 million

and 6 million illegal aliens in the United States today. Other estimates put the total closer to 10 million, most of whom entered between 1972 and 1982. The majority of them came from Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, and Southeast Asia. The political upheavals in El Salvador and Guatemala assuredly will send more people to the United States until the political problems there are resolved.

Neither party has proposed an effective way to stop refugees propelled by economic imbalance and political persecution—conditions that are likely to continue for some time to come. The Reagan administration's announcement that it will board foreign-flag vessels on the high seas to turn back illegal immigrants, even if this may be a violation of international law, says much about America's failure to solve the issue in an orderly and legal manner. Some other strong methods, such as incarceration and repatriation, have been judged to be illegal. For example, the attempt in 1980 by the United State Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)to deport some five thousand Haitians was blocked by a United States district judge on the grounds that the INS had violated the United States Constitution, the immigration statutes, international agreements, and INS regulations. In March 1982 another district judge ruled that the detention of Haitians while their asylum claims were being processed was discriminatory and unconstitutional. Nevertheless, by May 1982, 2,200 of them were still being held in Federal detention facilities in five states and Puerto Rico.

The search is on for an immigration policy that is worthy of American history, one that generously brings democracy, economic justice, human rights, and security together.

In 1982 the Senate passed a bill sponsored by Republican Senator Alan K. Simpson from Wyoming that tries to control the borders of the United States while holding them open for fair and orderly immigration. (The bill, sponsored in the House by Representative Romano Mazzoli of Kentucky, will probably be considered by that body in the autumn of 1982.) The Senate bill would limit legal immigrants to 425,000 annually, not counting refugees. No more than 20,000 immigrants could come from any one country, except Mexico and Canada, which would be permitted 40,000 each. The bill also provides for "work permits" for legal residents and fines and other punishment for employers who knowingly hire

illegal workers.

Opponents of the Simpson bill argue that it will not stop the flow of undocumented workers, especially those from Mexico, because it fails to consider the strong economic and social factors, such as higher wages and family reunification, that bring immigrants to the United States.

Yet all parties in the debate agree that American immigration and naturalization laws should be updated and enforced. They acknowledge that the borders cannot remain as open as they have been in the recent past. The Simpson-Mazzoli proposal is the starting point for future policy debates.

The relations between dominant and minority groups in Britain and the United States have generally been shaped by economic and political developments. For approximately a decade and a half after World War II, arrivals in Britain from the West Indies and in America from Puerto Rico and Mexico were prepared to join the working poor and become part of the general systems. Their poverty made them tractable, and they generally accepted the authority of the dominant culture without complaint, although they were not entirely assimilated to it. People asked only a little more income and security each year, and this was given to them without the economic and political systems having to change their basic structures. Immigrants to Britain and the United States were both exploited and ignored during this period. Organized political movements in which the poor and ethnic minorities could find coherent representation for their interests did not yet exist. The effective exclusion of the poor and ethnic groups from the political process led to an appearance of social peace. A broadening social and political consensus seemed to bring an end to ideological and political struggle and to reduce the role of political parties to that of handling technical matters of social efficiency. With the growth of capitalism and prosperity, it was believed that social and ethnic differences would disappear and that the minority groups would be absorbed into the dominant culture.

Educational programs during this period were generally informed by the "melting pot" ideal of the assimilationists. Education was for membership in the approved dominant culture and not in the several different minority cultures. Generally this required of ethnic minorities a repeated

repudiation of their own history and traditions and the abandonment of one personality and identity for another. As Young demonstrates, this association between personality and ethnic origin is very subtle and complex, involving as it does both stereotypes and reactions to them and sometimes causing an individual to try to become the person he thinks somebody else wants him to become.

During the affluent 1960s, significant shifts occurred in the social norms that Britons and Americans lived by. A new freedom was won for individuals and ethnic groups to choose their own commitments in life rather than accept society's ready-made ones. In America the black community was the first to emerge as an autonomous, articulate, and significant political force, and its influence spread to other ethnic groups in the United States and abroad, as all three papers in this volume show. Blacks rejected the traditional restrictions that had been placed on them, along with the authority of the dominant groups to impose them. Controls that long had been effective rapidly eroded. Dominant groups clearly saw that the deportment they preferred could no longer be counted on.

Thus "new identity seekers" emerged in the 1960s in the United States and in the early 1970s in Britain, partly as a result of the refusal of the host culture to assimilate the minority groups both culturally and structurally, and partly as a result of the minorities' new pride in their own cultural heritage. This resurgence of ethnic groups is one of the most important events since World War II and is clearly described in all three papers in this volume.

The initial liberal political response to the ethnic consciousness and revitalization movement in both Britain and the United States was to try to contain it within the doctrine of equality of opportunity. This doctrine sought to extend the benefits of society to minority groups (or to select members of them) without substantially changing the societal structures preferred by the dominant group. The doctrine stressed a fair and open competition, beginning from a position of initial equality, for unequal rewards of class, status, and power. The dominant group formulated the rules of the struggle and bestowed the rewards on the winners. The state intervened to assure some semblance of equality in the starting position and fairness in the contest.

(Conservatives also subscribed to the doctrine of equality

of opportunity, and stressed adherence to the culture and institutions of the dominant group, but they did not endorse the creation of an interventionist and regulatory state. Social differences, they believed, were the result of differences in natural capacities and motivation, and should not be tampered with.)

During this initial phase, liberal educationists in Britain and the United States sought to provide more and better services to help minority groups remedy social injustice and overcome the barriers in languages and ways of life that were assumed to be disadvantages for them. Professionally administered schooling and therapy were the preferred methods of transformation. During this phase, educationists in both countries established remedial and compensatory educational programs, such as Head Start and Upward Bound in America, and attempted to make the content of schooling relevant to the learner.

As the worth of these programs was questioned, and as the ethnic revitalization movement grew stronger, new programs were devised for minority groups. Foremost among these were ethnic studies (especially black studies), multicultural and bilingual curricula, including black ghetto English.

Supporters of these programs say that schools should mirror the students' own traditions, their homelife, and their special aspirations. If schools accepted this commission, they could be said to be recognizing the unique social and cultural attributes of each ethnic group and to be supporting each group's desire for greater autonomy.

But at the same time, these programs might be interpreted as attempts to co-opt the ethnic revitalization movement and bridge it to the dominant culture. For example, supporters of bilingualism in schools claim that if children at school can be taught in their native language, they will be less disoriented and better able to attend to the conventional requirements of schooling. These requirements traditionally have been established by the dominant groups through their control of the apparatus of the state and of extra-state organizations; thus the ethnic accommodation in the end facilitates the learning preferred by the dominant groups and confirms their power. A small amount of cultural autonomy is given in schools in return for acquiescence to dominant norms and structures outside of schools. This co-

optation theory is one now held by black leaders in Britain, as Raynor reveals.

Nevertheless, the debates over what school policies to adopt turn on the traditional conflict between individual development and gratification within a small ethnic world, or fulfillment within a larger and more varied public world. Both Young and Safa suggest that out of this educational dialectic today may come a new king of person, possessing vital characteristics of both minority and dominant cultures, who will in time alter both cultures.

On the Continent, educational policies that have been staunchly assimilationist in the past are now showing signs of flexibility. The main question for each country is whether the guest workers and their families will return home or stay and become immigrants. The major policy options are to educate the children of the guest workers so they can return to the sending country and operate fully and successfully within it; to educate them to be assimilated into the host country; or to try to do both simultaneously. The adopted policies will probably vary from country to country and from generation to generation of immigrants. The educational policies carried out so far have had mixed success. In Sweden, for example, they have produced some undesirable results, according to David Schwarz, editor of the *Journal of Immigrants and Minorities*. "The big problem," he says, "will come in the [1980s] when 100,000 to 200,000 immigrant children will be coming out of the schools without cultural pride but still without being Swedes. These people will not accept the menial jobs their fathers did. They want to become judges and generals when the society is not ready. It is a real social time bomb." Similar concerns have been expressed in other West European nations, and in Britain and the United States.

One of the most important factors affecting the decision of migrants to stay in the immigration countries or to return home, and to retain an integrated identity regardless of choice, is the family situation. Ethnic studies seem to have the effect of returning the family to the center of social analysis, a position it held in the 1960s after the publication in 1964 of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's report, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*. Moynihan found that many black households had a woman as head, and this, he said, led black family life into a "tangle of pathology." He

proposed federal services to help strengthen weakened families and to reduce the problems they created for themselves and society.

The apparent link between family and social problems persists. In Britain and the United States today a disproportionate number of people who drop out—do not complete schooling, have no work, turn to crime, or go on more or less permanent welfare—come from broken homes. The continuing importance of the family for success in education is suggested by several findings discussed in this volume. Weak family ties add to the educational problems of West Indians in Britain, who generally do not do as well in school as Asians or native Britons. The high rate of educational success for Asians both in Britain and the United States, where they do better than blacks and Hispanics, is frequently explained by the strength and help their families give them. Obviously these tentative explanations require much more comparative research. Intragroup crime and violence may erupt even when family ties are strong, as Young demonstrates. And, of course, it should be noted that educational success does not assure either cultural or structural assimilation, as both Young and Safa vividly show.

At the same time that minorities were finding new paths to follow, dominant classes, especially in Britain and the United States, showed their determination to reassert controls over minorities. The strategies for self- and ethnic-fulfillment in the 1960s and 1970s were diverse, but they were also expensive; and the claims of blacks and other ethnic groups for more money and services from national governments came at a time when the western capitalist system was less able to meet them. By 1982 there were 30 million people without jobs in the western world. Unemployment, recession, inflation, national frustrations, and cultural and moral traditionalism combined to create a reaction against ethnic demands in both Britain and the United States. The diminished promise of both countries led to quests for "national renewal" and a "new order," the political beneficiaries of which were Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. In Britain the goal of the new conservatism was to dismantle the welfare state and return to innovation, risk, and self-help. In the United States the "New Right" that emerged by the late 1970s was concerned with reducing government regulation of business and with social issues

such as abortion, busing, declining educational achievement, and school prayer. The political majorities in both countries deplored the upheavals of moral, cultural, and sexual standards with which ethnic groups were associated. Both in Britain and the United States resistance to assimilation by minority groups was seen by the dominant groups as ingratitude or defiance, as Raynor and Safa attest. If one group prefers assimilation and another group rejects it, social strife likely will take place. Social peace remains tenuous today. In Britain in recent polls 30 percent of the respondents said that "coloured" people who had not been born in Britain "should be sent back to their own country;" 58 percent said they considered "serious race riots" a likely possibility within the next ten years. In the United States in 1979 and 1980 40 to 50 percent of the public felt it might be necessary to use force to restore "the American way of life."

IV

Ethnic groups have broken the mold of traditional life in Western Europe and the United States—by their differences, their numbers, and their relentless pressure for recognition and attention to their wants. They have made Western Europe and the United States more varied places. But neither Western Europe nor the United States has devised an appropriate response to the new situation. The capacity for change is the mark of a healthy social system. Whether the nations of Western Europe and the United States can renew their social, cultural, political, and economic systems in the context of increasing cultural conflict and diversity will be one of the underlying questions for the 1980s.

All three authors whose work is included in this volume directly address this question, but they are not, understandably, able to give a final answer to it. Although the papers are different in subject matter, style, and tone, they share many features. The authors all bring to bear on this sensitive and complex issue a combination of intellectual breadth and rigor. They know that people are bound by their history even as they make it. They have an appreciation of the long-existing and deep-lying conditions that have limited and circumscribed ethnic life in Western Europe and the United States. They trace the reciprocal relations between large national developments and parochial ethnic events.

They examine public actions and policies together with such private matters as marriage and the family, child-rearing practices, educational patterns, and popular culture. They have as much interest in factors that cannot be quantified as in those that can. And they generally agree that cultural diversity is an asset and a necessary part of the enlargement of democracy.

Clearly, this volume will not sweep away all the hatred, misunderstanding, and prejudice regarding ethnic minorities that have accumulated over the years. Nevertheless, the contributors to the volume hope to reduce them and thus to increase the fullness and ease with which the numerous and varied groups of the world can interact with each other.

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Identity, Conflict, and Survival Mechanisms for Asian Americans

Lung-chang Young

Asian Americans constitute about 1.6 percent of the American population today. A small minority, they are nevertheless quite visible because of their distinct physical features and high concentration in a few big cities. The majority of them have roots in East Asia—China, Japan, and Korea. The rest of them are immigrants and their descendants from countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, India, Pakistan and others. Culturally heterogeneous and socially segregated, these varied ethnic groups do not display any sense of collective identity, but they do share some common experiences in dealing with problems peculiar to their status as racially distinct minorities in American society. Following the Weberian style, this paper attempts an interpretive understanding of their shared experiences, especially the experiences of Chinese and Japanese Americans. The focus will be on three sets of interrelated problems—identity, conflict, and survival mechanisms. The purpose is to delineate the range of these problems, to identify major types, and to examine the effects of formal and informal education on the changing patterns of ethnic response to the challenge of the larger society.

Identity

To the simple question "Who am I?" Robert Bierstadt coined an interesting answer in the spirit of Charles Cooley's "looking-glass self": "I am not what I think I am. I am not what you think I am. I am what I think you think I am."[1] This means that identity is not something given as a solid entity, but is socially bestowed, socially sustained and socially transformed.[2] I can be a different self in different social situations, depending upon what particular role I am playing at the moment and what is the assumed image of me on the part of others in the social encounter.

Given this sociological truism, we must assume that certain component parts of the ever-changing multiple identity are more likely to remain at the center of attention than other parts in spite of the changing situations. Their relative prominence is determined by the attitude of what George Mead calls "the generalized others." The so-called ethnic identity is of such a quality; it stands out as an endurable part of self-image because of the assumed special attention paid to it by the generalized others, or the larger society.

Ethnic identity is composed of three major sets of traits: the ascribed ethnic traits, the learned cultural traits, and the achieved social traits. The ascribed traits refer to the exterior physiological features of the group as well as such invisible ascribed characteristics as locality and time of birth. The learned traits consist of numerous symbolic and ideational elements that are manifested in communicative and behavioral patterns. The achieved traits include membership of occupational groups and position in the stratified society. The relative importance assigned to these identity traits varies from group to group. For most European ethnic groups in American society, the ascribed traits command no special attention. Adult individuals identify each other primarily on the basis of cultural and social traits.

The experiences of Asian ethnic groups are different, for the ascribed part of their identity is subject to curious inquiry and often poses as a puzzle to those who are accustomed to classifying people in dichotomous color terms. Furthermore, the ethnic identity of early immigrants from Asia was characterized by an entanglement of all three sets of traits in the form of a single stereotype. Significant

changes in their identity often result from the collective effort to separate the cultural from the ascribed, and to place the achieved traits at the center of attention.

While physical traits are rooted in the fatherland and social positions are achieved in the host society, the cultural traits, by definition, have to be derived from both sources for most Asian Americans. Because of the different emphasis placed on the two sources of culture and the inevitable variation in the learning process, there appear in the Asian ethnic communities various types of cultural identification, a phenomenon highly important to our understanding of the dynamics of ethnic identity.

Types of Cultural Identification

We may construct a typology of cultural identification on the basis of shared subjective meanings and modes of conduct as observed in Asian American communities. Four types can be clearly identified; we may label them as traditionalists, assimilationists, shifting identity adapters, and new identity seekers.[3]

The traditionalists feel they are still natives of their original homeland no matter how long they have lived in this country. Having strongly internalized their native culture, they have no desire to change their habitual behavior. Nor are they willing to go through the difficult process of resocialization according to the demand of the host society. Their identity is sustained and frequently reinforced by members of the same ethnic groups with whom they constantly interact in their everyday life. The traditionalists consist primarily of old immigrants and newcomers living in the ethnic enclaves such as Chinatown or Little Tokyo. They also include socially isolated professionals from Asia who refuse to change their identity. An example of the latter type is the schoolteacher in a middle-sized community, who, when asked whether she would consider herself an Asian American, replied: "I think I prefer only Chinese. I don't like the term [Asian American]. I mean I am an American citizen, but I am Chinese. It's two separate things. Why bother to change your identity as Asian American? That's my feeling."[4]

From the perspective of the host society, the traditionalists are regrettably unassimilable. Yet from their own

viewpoint, their "life world" is tension-free and completely meaningful. There is a high degree of congruence between the traditionalists' subjective identification and the objective identification of the majority in society who would regard the Asian Americans as Asians rather than Americans. The traditionalists are therefore not prone to self-doubt or embarrassment in everyday social encounters.

The assimilationists, by contrast, consider themselves as bona fide Americans. Having internalized American values and norms, they seek to participate fully in American society. The great majority of them were born and educated in America; they feel no emotional attachment to the native soil of their parents or grandparents. By choosing to live in white communities they keep little contact with their fellow ethnic members in the enclaves. They believe they have little in common with the traditionalists. Some of them would go so far as to avoid talking or walking together with fellow ethnic members in public, indicating that they are actually very conscious of their physical mark, no matter how strong they would deny its importance and relevance. Their identity claim is primarily based on their achieved social traits and is supported by fellow Americans around them. This identity, however, is inherently precarious. A Japanese Sansei (third generation Japanese), for instance, has every reason to claim that he is a hundred percent American. But once in a while someone would remind him that he is after all a Japanese and should be treated like a foreigner. Under such circumstances he is no longer sure what he thinks other people think he is. This is the so-called "identity crisis."

Barring a strong sense of ethnic pride, a simple solution to the crisis is to learn how to ignore it. Perhaps the majority can do so. Some assimilationists react to the crisis with an even stronger determination to achieve greater occupational success; their purpose is simply to prove that they are genuine Americans molded by the genuine American dream.

The shifting identity adapters represent the synthesis of the two polar types described above. They are found in different types of communities and in different age groups and social classes, but more frequently in professional groups outside the ethnic enclaves. Typically they have acquired sets of selective cultural traits from both Asian and American sources through formal and informal education and have retained a balanced sense of pride, loyalty, and

sentimental attachment to both their homeland and the new world of their own choice. They value the intimate relations with their family members and ethnic friends, but on the other hand they are deeply involved in the less intimate but more demanding networks of secondary relations in the working place and professional world. As a result, they acquire a strong sense of multiple identity with which they cope with the ever-changing situations and requirements. Typically, their identities shift from the breakfast table to lunch meetings and from office working days to weekends. The shift is smooth and automatic as long as the actor possesses a good skill in role playing. From the viewpoint of the actor, there is nothing wrong in believing that he is both an Asian and an American. In fact, he feels he has no alternative but to transform himself from being an Asian to an American or vice versa from time to time. According to Lyman and Douglass, identity shifting is sometimes used as a tactic when the particular identity of the actor becomes distinctly disadvantageous and another seems to promise better payoffs in the encounter. Thus,

> The American-born son of immigrant parents might find it advantageous to invoke his membership in the Samyui speech group when interacting with a speaker of Sam yup dialect; in the Cantonese regional group when encountering a fellow from Shanghai... Moreover, he may find it to be fun or profitable to be "Japanese" when seeking a date with a Nisei girl, to be "Hawaiian" when confronting people interested in people from exotic and tropical environments; and to be "just plain American" when seeking a job.[5]

Switching of ethnic or subethnic identities is thus not only automatic but can be consciously manipulated in both intraethnic and interethnic relations. It is an art of ethnic impression management.

The new identity seekers were the rebellious college students of Chinese and Japanese descent, a product of the 1960s and 1970s. Today their anger has faded away, but their influence lingers. They deserve attention because they exemplify a distinctive type. Not surprisingly, they rejected much of the Asian values and behavior patterns associated with the traditionalists, such as unquestioned obedience to parental authority and high educational achievement, and

at the same time they were highly critical of the assimilationists, calling them "over-Westernized" marginal men or "bananas," which stands for people who are "yellow outside but white inside." Since they were unable or unwilling to identify closely with either Asian culture or American culture, they needed to construct a new identity that could somehow reflect their unique experiences.

A survey of the literature produced by this group during the 1960s and 1970s indicates that their common identity was derived from two kinds of unique experiences: the historical experience of their ancestors in America, and their personal experience with the ghetto life in American cities. It is true that the nineteenth century immigrants from China or Japan suffered the worst racism on the West Coast. Their history, largely unknown to their children and long forgotten by the majority, was rediscovered and used as a mirror through which the present generation saw their own conditions. In their view, part of the history was repeated in the present ethnic ghetto. For behind the glittering neon lights and newly painted storefronts in Chinatown, they found hard labor, poverty, and intensive exploitation. Looking through the superficial layer of prosperity, they saw persistent effects of past racism and the true picture of the collective self.

The intense identification with past and present suffering was a peculiar feature of the radical group. It was not shared by the hard-working traditionalists. Nor did it elicit any warm response from the assimilationists and the shifting identity adapters. Worse still, the inclusive label "Asian Americans" that they adopted for the "pan-Asian Movement" failed to gain wide acceptance. There is no such thing as a common cultural identity among people from diverse ethnic groups. Filipinos find it difficult to identify closely with East Asians; Indians, and even Koreans, have resisted "amalgamation" with Chinese and Japanese.[6]

Although all Asian Americans can be roughly differentiated in terms of these four types, few individuals possess all the characteristic traits of any one type. It is only correct to say that an individual is closer to one particular type than to another at a certain stage of his life. As identities are transformable, so are these types. A person with assimilationist inclinations may be transformed into a new identity seeker and a few years later may become a shifting-identity

adapter or may return to his or her original identity as predominantly an assimilationist.

In the same sense, the relative size of groups differentiated according to the four types of identification changes with time. In theory, the size of the traditionalist group is bound to decrease when more and more old immigrants fade away. There are clear signs, however, that this natural trend has been reversed in recent years because of the influx of new immigrants who will sooner or later replace the aging residents in ethnic enclaves and carry on the tradition. As the group of new identity seekers declined in the late 1970s, there has been a steady increase in the size of assimilationists. But the group that seems to have grown faster than others is the one associated with the shifting identity adapters. It grows with the increasing popularity of the ideology of cultural pluralism.

What has formal and informal education to do with the acquisition and transformation of identities? How are the dynamics of identities related to the life cycle of the individual? With such questions in mind, we shall turn to examine Asian Americans' experience with the process of acculturation.

From the viewpoint of the majority, the purpose of acculturation is for the individual to learn and internalize the cultural traits of the host society; in the process the individual would have to reject many of the incompatible or conflicting elements that he has learned at an early stage of socialization. His success of acculturation often hinges upon the diminishing influence of the family in face of the increasingly powerful influence of formal education, peer group pressure, and mass communication media. In some cases it is achieved through mutual reinforcement of the various agencies of socialization. According to Milton Gordon's model, acculturation represents the first step of assimilation, behavioral assimilation. The next phase is structural assimilation, which means entrance into the clubs, cliques, and institutions of the host society.[7]

Various writers have noted the unassimilability of Asian Americans in the past. To explain this phenomenon they emphasized such factors as the inherent conservative nature of the Oriental culture and, more importantly, the institutionalized discrimination against Orientals in American society. As most of these studies were done at the

time when the majority of Japanese Sansei and second-generation Chinese Americans were still too young to serve as objects of observation, they failed to take into account the crucial factor of generational differences in acculturation. This deficiency, however, is no longer shown in recent studies on acculturation, in which the importance of the generational factor has been clearly recognized.[8] Yet there is still a shortage of empirical studies on the changing patterns of acculturation for second- and third-generation Asian Americans who have grown up since the 1960s and 1970s. The following analysis is necessarily tentative; it is primarily concerned with the emerging new patterns of acculturation and the effects of education on the changing patterns.

The Process of Acculturation

The first and crucial step in the process of acculturation is to learn the host language. According to a recent census report, one of every ten American residents in 1980 said he spoke a language other than English in his home. In New York City and Los Angeles, more than 20 percent of the population are foreign-born.[9] A child of foreign-born parents is born into a world of transplanted foreign symbols. This symbolic world, however, is by no means a well insulated one; it provides no guard against infiltration of the powerful English sound. The child is thus exposed to two linguistic systems at a very early age. The process of acculturation begins as soon as the child learns the first English word and steps into a new world of symbols from which he will acquire other cultural traits of the host society.

The pattern of language acculturation may be illustrated by the case of Chinese American children whose parents are first-generation immigrants. In such families, the parents speak their own particular dialect, such as Mandarin, Cantonese, Shanghai and many others. If husband and wife do not speak the same dialect, they have to make a compromise by using a modified form of Mandarin or Cantonese as a medium of everyday communication. Typically, the preschool children in such families learn both Chinese and English at the same time. They learn Chinese from parents and pick up English words from a variety of sources—siblings, playmates, babysitters, and, more importantly, the

television set. If the parents are also proficient in English, the training of bilingual children at home could be tilted on the English side. Frequently the infant learns simple English words first and Chinese later.

Once the children are enrolled in public school, a marked change in their communication habits takes place. For the children now must adapt to the overwhelmingly English environment. Out of communication necessity and under strong peer pressure, they must learn how to speak colloquial English in an amazingly short period. For the majority of Chinese children, this is a period of transition from the home-molded bilingual habit to the school-molded monolingual habit. With increasing fluency in spoken English, the children begin to adopt a negative attitude toward their mother tongue, which is felt to be a detachable part of the visible ethnic stigma. They speak Chinese at home less and less unless their parents have real difficulties in understanding English.

Chinese parents do not react to their children's linguistic transition in the same way. Some parents welcome it; they believe their children should concentrate on learning English in order to achieve better academic success. Others take it as a sign of failure in family socialization; they set up even firmer rules to enforce the bilingual practice at home. The majority of parents, however, accept it as unavoidable, but not without a sense of regret. They hope their children will develop an interest in learning Chinese and keep alive some of the ageless Chinese cultural heritage in the overseas community.

For many parents in the last category, their shared hope has come true in recent years. Since the wave of ethnic pride reached Chinese Americans in the 1970s, a new type of informal organization—the weekend Chinese language school—has appeared in most communities with a high concentration of Chinese populations. The school is organized by local parents with the cooperation of their children and adolescent sons and daughters. It provides a two-hour language course every Saturday afternoon taught by experienced mothers or hired teachers. Needless to say, its manifest function is as much educational as social and recreational. In some places the school has grown into a semiformalized institution supported by hundreds of Chinese families in surrounding communities. The weekly

language lesson is usually followed by a talent show organized by the youngsters and a joyful dinner party to which each family contributes a dish.

It should be noted that the informal language schools have come into existence only in small cities and middle class metropolitan suburbs where the government-supported bilingual programs were unavailable. They provide an alternative to formal bilingual education, which has suffered a decline under the new wave of conservatism in educational policies in the early 1980s.

Having already immersed themselves in the American youth culture, few of the high school youths of Chinese origin went voluntarily to the weekend language classes. When they became of college age, however, many of them began to relax their resistance to the imposed Chinese culture. Interestingly, in recent years there has been a steady rise of interest among college students of Chinese descent in taking Chinese language courses at their respective universities. According to the rough estimate of several language teachers, more than half of the students enrolled in elementary Chinese are now Chinese Americans. It is not clear why they choose to do so. Perhaps they wanted an easy grade. Perhaps they developed a new sense of ethnic pride at universities. Or they might have felt uneasy when they found many of their American friends had developed genuine interests in Chinese culture and language while they themselves were ignorant about it. They might also regret that they had refused to take free language lessons from their parents during their grade school years.

This resurgence of interest in seeking cultural roots has also occurred in other Asian ethnic groups. According to a recently published survey of Japanese Americans, among the third generation Japanese (the Sansei), only 2.4 percent speak Japanese fluently, but 79 percent of them believe they should know more about Japanese culture.[10]

The foregoing description suggests a dialectical pattern of change in cultural identities as experienced by second-generation Chinese Americans before they reach adulthood. The childhood bilingual experience of the individual sets the stage for a double cultural identity. At the second stage, the school age individual seeks total conformity with the youth culture of the host society by rejecting much of the native cultural elements he has learned from parents. The third

stage is marked by a gradual return to the double culture identity which contains the seeds of his childhood experience but is qualitatively different from it. This "negation of negation" pattern may also account for the changes in eating and drinking habits. Asian American children in their homes initially are fed with both Oriental food and the more convenient American food. Before long, they force their mothers to prepare nothing but hot dogs and french fries. As teenagers, they exhibit the most definite identification with the least sophisticated kind of American food, a phenomenon well explained by Georg Simmel: "Food and drink have always been the common denominators of large groups for which any other shared mood or interest are hard to attain."[11]

With the end of the teenage quest for total conformity has come a new appreciation for their native homemade Oriental cooking. Now they take pride in being able to read the menu in a Chinese restaurant and to order something special for their American friends.

Conflict

If an identity problem is likely to be associated with youth, various kinds of conflict are more keenly experienced by Asian Americans at a later stage of life. In this section we will examine their experience with three levels of conflict—generational, intragroup, and intergroup.

Generational Conflict

Real and potential conflict between generations happens everywhere in modern society, but it can be more intense in the Asian American community. It is difficult for any American parents, let alone new immigrants, to understand the dynamics of youth subculture. The first generation Asian parents exhibit a high degree of intolerance to their children's behavior that appears so strange to them and so different from their standard of decency. They are also shocked by the small amount of homework their children bring home from school. By and large, they are unhappy with the liberal approach of public schools in America. In their view, the school is too carefree and loosely structured, especially compared with what they have seen in their home

country. It fails to discipline the youth and to instill in their minds the basic moral ideals. It places little emphasis on academic achievement and does nothing to inspire children to aim at higher professional choices. What the parents have to do in a harsh way at home is simply to counterbalance what the teachers have failed to do at school.

Many Asian parents have been quite successful in exercising firm control over their children and guiding them to achieve impressive academic success. Others have failed and have had to make a compromise with their resentful children in order to avoid further conflict. Eventually all of them have realized that they could no longer demand unquestioned obedience from their children and that many of the traditional methods of socialization would not work in the United States.

One of the traditional practices relinquished by Asian Americans is the institution of arranged marriage. A survey result shows that nearly 84 percent of the Japanese Issei (first generation Japanese) reported that their Japanese parents arranged their marriage.[12] The incidence of arranged marriage among old Chinese immigrants could be higher. Clearly, such practices were totally unacceptable to the second generation and had to be abandoned. Yet most Asian parents still attempt to exercise strong influence over their sons' and daughters' choices of mates. They still prefer marriage within the same ethnic group, but at the same time they believe that marriage is a personal matter and should be handled by the couple involved. This means that in the face of strong challenges from their children, they are no longer opposed to cross-cultural marriage. But not all ethnic groups are equally flexible on this issue, as a recent study shows:

> There is a great deal of variability among the Asian American sample over the question of intermarriage. Filipinos, many of whom are married to native Americans, voice no opposition to the practice. The other four groups (Indians, Pakistanis, Chinese, and Koreans) are somewhat split in their reaction. However even in the cases where opposition is fairly strong, these feelings are usually qualified. Many who expressed a personal preference for marriage within the ethnic group went further to acknowledge that the issue was serious and deserving of careful deliberation.[13]

Despite the increasing tolerance of cross-cultural marriage, most Asian Americans are unwilling to accept blacks and other mistreated racial minorities as marriage partners. This is understandable, for they do not want their children to suffer from even worse prejudice and discrimination than their own fathers have experienced.

So far we have seen conflict between parents and children. Using the three-generation model, we find another potentially explosive area of concern for Asian Americans, the conflict between married grown-ups and their parents. This is the problem of grandparents, reflecting a deep-rooted difference in values and expectations between East and West. As the less acculturated old parents become more dependent of their children, problems of their care arise. A case in point is the Japanese Issei as described by Kitano: "There was also a strong emphasis on filial piety. It was originally a reciprocal obligation, but many Issei have felt that in the United States it was somewhat unilateral: the story of Issei parents denying their own needs for their children is common, whereas the converse is less likely to occur."[14]

Filial piety is of cardinal significance in the ethical system of Confucianism, which has been deeply imbedded in East Asian culture and in the psyches of the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean people. In premodern times, it gave meaning to detailed rules of conduct governing parent/children relationships and provided justification for the extended family structure that functioned as an insurance system for old age. Although much of the ritual elements and arbitrary demands inherent in the principle of filial piety have long been eliminated in practice, the central idea that grown-ups have the obligation to take care of aged parents has never been under serious challenge; it remains alive in the mind of Asian people, including those who have migrated to the United States and have tried to inculcate the same value in the young.

According to various observers, most American-born Asians accepted the moral teaching half-heartedly and felt obliged for the care of the aged, but they were not really convinced that the old-fashioned Confucian prescriptions could survive the challenge of Western norms, which define family obligations in terms of the values of individualism, self-reliance, and respect for each other's privacy. Moreover,

they realized that the urban way of life in modern society was in every way incompatible with the traditional style of joint family—that the house or apartment was designed for a nuclear family and their grandparents would have to live somewhere else at their own risk. As the famous storybook illustrates, Little Red Riding Hood has to bring homemade cookies to her grandma who lives in the woods and seems to be in constant danger of being eaten by the wolf. Even if they can afford to put their parents in the so-called "in-law apartment," they are usually too busy to take good care of them. Where else can they accommodate them? Most Asian Americans have negative feelings about the institution of nursing homes for the aged. In their opinion, nursing homes are pathetic, miserable, and ill-equipped to provide what the aged really need: love, respect, Oriental food, and a few friends thay can talk to in their own language.[15]

It is also true that the retired parents may not feel happy or at ease living with their married sons or daughters. The feeling of loneliness can be intense if they settle down in a middle class suburban neighborhood. If they are fortunate enough to have more than one married child in the United States, they may choose to spend a portion of time every year with each of their children. This rotating system for grandparents has become rather popular among all Asian ethnic groups, for it proves to be effective in minimizing the unpleasant friction that is bound to occur if the parents stay too long in the house.

Intragroup Conflict

As a rule, intensive contact generates intensive conflict; violent crime tends to be intraracial rather than interracial. Intragroup conflict is inevitable, but it has never grown into a major problem for Asian ethnic groups except the Chinese. Unlike other Asian minorities, Chinese Americans have a long history of settlement in urban enclaves in isolation of the larger society. They have transformed the enclave into a unique type of community that is at the same time a residential area, a place for small scale manufacturing, a tourist attraction, and a most active commercial center. This is the so-called Chinatown. Chinatowns of varied size exist in most big cities in this country. The largest ones are found in San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, and in Toronto,

Canada. The New York Chinatown, for example, started with a small number of families and a few stores about a hundred years ago. Its initial slow growth before the 1950s was primarily due to internal migration of Chinese from the West Coast. It has changed drastically since 1965, with the establishment of a new immigration law which abolished the "national origin" quota system. It was expanded from the original center around Mott Street to all directions. It even invaded into the fringe of "Little Italy" without much resistance. It caused a transformation of the neighboring Bowery Street, one of the most depressed sights in New York, where one always saw dozens of drunkards sleeping on the sidewalk, day and night. The cheap bars were replaced by Chinese restaurants, and part of the slums were cleared up for a high-rise apartment building called Confucius Plaza. Chinatown is still expanding and booming. No one knows how many Chinese are living in the area today. Estimates range from seventy-five thousand to one hundred-fifty thousand.

The boom of Chinatown in recent years has been caused by the influx of new immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other parts of Asia. These newcomers are quite different from the old immigrants, for almost all of them are from urban centers with better education and business expertise. Many of them have brought sizable capital into the area, stirring up a tremendous growth in the value of real estate.

The intragroup conflict in Chinatown is essentially economic in nature. The economic boom leads to intensified business competition among Chinese themselves and accelerated transfer of money from one hand to another. As the Chinese proverb says, "big fish eats small fish; small fish eats shrimp." But the big fish in Chinatown can never compete with the sharks or whales somewhere on Wall Street. A larger number of fish and shrimp of varied size are involved in the restaurant business. There are nearly two hundred and fifty restaurants within five blocks in New York's Chinatown and more than forty-five hundred in the Greater New York metropolitan area.[16]

Because of close competition, most of them, especially those whose customers are mostly Chinese, must keep the price low and the quality of the food high. In order to survive at a small profit, the restaurant owners must rely on the classical method of exploitation by prolonging the working

hours of their employees. A cook with good skill and experience is expected to be able to prepare one thousand different dishes a day and work six days a week. Working in front of the burning oil and heat for so long, he has no appetite for eating anything himself. A waiter usually works fourteen hours a day, six days a week, with a wage far below the minimum level. There is no union, no health insurance, and no retirement or other benefits.

Another source of employment in Chinatown is the garment industry. There are roughly three hundred sweat shops in Chinatown, including many small ones with four or five sewing machines. These shops employ one-half of the working women in the community. For years the wage was below the minimum level and the working conditions were very poor, but the women workers did not complain, for they knew they had language trouble and could not find jobs outside Chinatown. In spite of the poor wage, they did enjoy some convenience and freedom. A young mother, for example, could bring her baby to the shop and take breaks to feed the baby. Since 1976 many workers have become unionized. But it is doubtful whether those small shop owners could, in fact, observe the union contract, in view of their own precarious position and weak bargaining power in dealing with big contractors outside Chinatown.

Given the intense competition among struggling entrepreneurs and the downright exploitation of workers, the potential class conflict has rarely reached the explosive stage in Chinatown. Two factors may account for this: a shared sense of interdependence, and the effect of kinship relationships. Bernard Wong in his recent study of Chinatown indicates that kinship plays a decisive role in the entrepreneurial activities of many businesses in the community, where a common complaint heard is the lack of kinsmen and friends to assist in the development of the business. In addition to the economic role, kinship also functions to maintain the "family spirit" in the rationally organized business firms. As Wong pointed out, in many business establishments, kinship, friendship, patron-client relationship, employer/employee relationships are often intertwined; and this seems to work well.[17]

A real explosive intragroup conflict in Chinatown was the one between business establishments and the criminal

youth gangs that shocked the whole community in the 1970s. Gang members were teenage boys from new immigrant families where the father typically worked in a restaurant and the mother in a sweatshop. Frustrated in school and unable to stay long in their small, dark, empty rooms, these youth came to street corners to find friends with similar problems. This was how criminal youth gangs suddenly appeared. For many decades Chinatown had the reputation of low crime and juvenile delinquency rates. Chinese Americans were praised for their family system and child-rearing practices. Now, with the emergence of violent youth gangs, the old conception had to be revised. The factor of poverty and the ghetto way of life seem to be more important than cultural factors in explaining the high or low crime rates.

Youth gangs have been a familiar phenomenon in the ethnic communities of New York City: Irish gangs in the 1870s, Italian gangs in the 1920s, Puerto Rican gangs in the 1950s. In 1972 the formation of youth gangs in Chinatown began to attract attention. The gang membership grew rapidly in the next few years. There were four or five powerful gangs with such names as Black Eagle, White Eagle, Flying Dragon and Ghost Shadow. The leaders were in their early twenties; the followers were teenagers, including some thirteen-year-olds recruited from a local junior high school. Their major activity was extortion. Almost all stores in Chinatown at that time were subject to blackmail. Store owners were asked to pay the group monthly fees of fifty or sixty dollars for protection. A few big restaurants had to pay forty thousand dollars a year to avoid trouble. As a rule, all victims were Chinese and few of them were willing to serve as witnesses when some gang members were arrested and put on trial. Frequently these various groups were involved in a power struggle with shooting and killing in movie theaters or restaurants. The worst year was 1977, during which most stores had to close early in the evening and business in Chinatown declined by 40 percent.[18]

By 1978 the criminal activities were finally put under control after the arrest of the leader of the Ghost Shadow group. Today Chinatown is once again a safe place to visit, but the basic factors leading to violent intragroup conflict have by no means been totally eliminated.

Intergroup Conflict

Chinese, Japanese, and other ethnic groups of Asian origin do not have the same experiences of conflict with the majority in American society. By and large, the early comers have suffered most from racial discrimination, while the newcomers have encountered few social and legal barriers in their effort to settle down in the new world. This difference in experience reflects the increasing tolerance of racial diversity on the part of American people and the increasing expansion of legal commitment to nondiscrimination. By 1980 more than 420,000 Indochinese refugees had peacefully settled in American communities without undergoing any harsh treatment. This is very encouraging, but the pendulum swings and no one is sure it will not swing back in the future. As long as the roots of racial prejudice remain alive, potential conflict between Asian minorities and the majority population always exists.

As the experiences of early immigrants from rural China during the latter part of the nineteenth century indicate, the social-cultural roots of racial prejudice are often intertwined with economic competition. In the 1860s the presence of a large number of strangers with peculiar physical features and peculiar dress, hair style, language, and manner alarmed the ethnocentric people of the community. The strangers posed a repulsive threat to their normal way of life. At first they were tolerated because they were kept out of the sight of the community by working as miners and railroad builders. Later, as the demand for cheap labor decreased, the Chinese began to stay in the completely segregated urban ghettos of the West Coast and to be employed in the woolen, textile, clothing, shoe-making, cigar-making, and a few other small-scale manufacturing firms. When the depression of the 1870s put large numbers of white laborers out of work, Chinese workers became the object of labor union hostility. Sparked by the agitation of labor leaders and local politicians, the anti-Chinese movement entered a new phase of violence. Riots against the Chinese occurred in many cities and small towns. And during this period and thereafter, various kinds of anti-Chinese legislation were hastily put into effect. They were designed to exclude Chinese from immigration, to prohibit their seeking employment in most types of industry, and to harass and humiliate them. By the

turn of the century, the Chinese were concentrated inside Chinatown. Since their wives and children were not allowed to join them, Chinatown was a one-sex community for several decades. As a result, prostitution and gambling became widespread, and this served to prove that Chinese were indeed immoral. So discrimination led to new prejudice: the vicious circle went on and on until the final years of World War II.

The early immigrants from Japan were treated not as badly as the Chinese, but they had the bitter experience of being locked up in the relocation camps during the war years. In this case, the discrimination was rationalized by the assumed public anger directed toward the whole country where the immigrants came from.

The 1965 immigration law marks the official ending of discrimination against Asians. It also signifies the quickened ebbing of prejudice in the minds of the majority. The only visible elements of the nineteenth century racism are perhaps the negative stereotypes associated with the Asian Americans. The survived stereotypes are fewer in number and less offending than those circulated in the past. A 1962 study on the phenomenon of ethnophaulisms listed f.fty-six derogatory nicknames for blacks and eighteen for Asians.[19] What we hear now are limited to "Japs," "Chinks," and a few other racial slurs circulated in the school yard.

It would be a naive assumption, however, that such encouraging signs will lead to final elimination of prejudice and discrimination against Asian minorities in this country. To be sure, no legal rules can stop silent prejudice or subtle discrimination. Qualified Asian professionals are accepted by most employers as long as they are small in number in the organization and their visible presence does not cause any alarm. Once accepted, they have to tolerate either lesser salary plus slow promotion or jealous resentment from their co-workers. Indeed, few of them can expect promotion to the top level of the managerial hierarchy. Moreover, they have to be prepared for the worst under the circumstances of economic recession and rising unemployment, for historically they are the first victims of the recurring wave of nativism, which is defined by Barrington Moore as follows: "By nativism I mean an energetic and somewhat distorted reaffirmation of the indigenous way of life, a reaction often produced in a society that feels itself

threatened by forces beyond its understanding and control."[20]

Survival Mechanisms

Despite the initial adverse circumstances and the potential intergroup conflict, Asian Americans as a whole have not only survived but have achieved success in American society without giving up much of their ethnic culture. In 1980, Asian Americans had a higher median income than white Americans. Their average level of education was the highest among all groups.[21] This achievement may be partly explained by the fact that many new immigrants from Asia are professional and business people. But more importantly, it is due to the accumulated effects of an effective strategy of adaptation employed by the Asian immigrants. To illustrate the Japanese strategy, Kitano used the metaphor of a small stream: "Like a stream, they have followed the contours of the land, followed the lines of least resistance, avoided direct confrontation, and developed at their own pace, always shaped by the external realities of the larger society. It is basically a strategy of accommodation."[22]

This is obviously a common strategy adopted by all Asian minorities. It suggests passive adaptation to the world beyond their control as well as active manipulation of opportunities within their reach. Both of the passive and active sides of the strategy are linked to their cultural roots; their effects are manifested in the patterns of intergenerational mobility and community development.

Intergenerational Mobility

As mentioned before, the first wave of immigrants from China and Japan were legally restricted in their choice of occupations. Following the lines of least resistance, many Chinese settled in the hand laundry business which was totally unattractive to other job-seeking groups. The rest of the Chinese started to run small restaurants, grocery stores, and some other forms of small businesses. The Japanese, on the other hand, had to work as farm laborers or sharecroppers in the countryside and as gardeners or servants for rich people in urban centers. Both groups carried their own cultural value of hard work and frugality which was by no

means different from the old-fashioned Protestant work ethic preached in the West. The old immigrants were realistic in sizing up their own limited life chances but quite optimistic about the future of their children raised in the new world. In their correct assessment, the next generation should have the undenied rights and much better opportunity to brighten their life prospects through education.

The educational institutions in American society were built on the principle of localism and noncentralization. Given the differences in educational quality caused by unequal allocation of resources, all schools have been moving toward increasing standardization through the professionalization of school personnel and the development of common requirements nationwide. Together with the mass media and the economic system that has given rise to an integrated common market, American schools have played a crucial role in shaping the pattern of American culture that transcends the diversified regional, class, and ethnic subcultures and group interests. Besides, education is the only institution in which individuals can actively manipulate the situation and translate the widely held myth of equality of opportunity into reality. It is, in fact, the only legitimate means available to everyone by which the culturally defined goal of success can be obtained.

Almost intuitively, Asian Americans understood all of this. Respect for education is a dominant feature of their culture; and it is shared by all social classes. In the words of Confucius, this means "in education there is no class distinction." Asian Americans were also alert enough to take full advantage of the steady expansion of higher educational opportunities for the less fortunate groups. They seem to have taken a step ahead of other ethnic groups in encouraging their children to go to college and beyond in order to reach a status level that could match the traditional Chinese literati or the Indian Brahmins. It is not unusual to find a retired Japanese tenant farmer or a Chinese laundryman who has sent all three of his children to Ivy League universities or professional schools. The new immigrants and their children today are equally alert to the rising demand for certain types of professional training. They believe that science and engineering are the lines of least resistance that ethnic minorities should follow to avoid frustration in their struggle for success.

While this has been true of the first and second generation of Asian Americans, it is not entirely clear whether the third generation will place the same emphasis on higher education. Judging from the fact that there has been a class differential in educational aspiration in American society, we may assume that this high aspiration inherent in the Oriental cultural heritage will be transmitted to the third generation or later simply because the majority of them are from the better educated middle-class families.

Community Development

As we have seen, early immigrants were forced to live in ghetto-like enclaves in isolation of the larger society. The typical survival mechanism was avoidance rather than confrontation. Gradually, the pattern of passive submission has been changed to that of active manipulation with available opportunities. The booming Chinatown has become a most desirable place to live for many newcomers who need job security and emotional support. Now the choice to settle down there is voluntary.

The Japanese community suggests another pattern of transformation. The increasing rate of social mobility has led to an erosion of Japanese community because most Nisei and Sansei (second and third generation Japanese) have abandoned the so-called "middleman" position together with the small businesses inherited from their fathers and moved into the dominant economic structure of the larger society.[23] Today, less than 25 percent of Japanese Americans stay in Little Tokyo or Little Osaka on the West Coast. Physically dispersed, most of them have managed to maintain a sense of ethnic cohesion by establishing ties of kinship, friendship, and business association.

As the Japanese town declined, the Korean town began to rise. Since the middle of the 1960s more than 350,000 Koreans have migrated to the United States and formed their own community in various cities. In Los Angeles, for example, more than 100,000 Koreans have settled in the area formerly occupied by the Japanese. The new Korean town has its peculiar flavor. It is a highly self-sufficient and self-contained community. It has its own stores, insurance agencies, banks, and small hospitals. It has its own Christian churches which function as community centers

for social and recreational activities. The economy of the community depends on its professional residents who derive their income from working outside of the community. So this community, a more modernized one than Chinatown, is for the shifting identity adapters.

Conclusion

The objectively observable patterns of mobility through education and community development are consequences of meaningful action and interaction among millions of Asian Americans over time. They also reflect the dynamics of the collective mind that is essentially composed of two contradictory elements: (1) mobility, revealing the collective desire to get out of the nest and seek adventures in the larger society, and (2) community development, indicating the opposing desire to stay in or return to the nest for peace and comfort. In the past the solution to the contradictory desires had to be worked out in two generations.

We have just discussed a possible new solution, which is to synthesize the two elements in the mind of a single individual; this can be done by any individual, especially the shifting identity adapters. This type of cross-cultural personality suggests the future for Asian Americans.

Endnotes

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5. Stanford M. Lyman, *The Asian in North America* (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-Clio, Inc.), 206.

6. See Richard W. Trottier, "Charters of Panethnic Identity: Indigenous American Indians and Immigrant Asian-Americans," in *Ethnic Change* ed. Charles F. Keyes (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), 281.

7. See Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

8. See Eric Woodrum, "An Assessment of Japanese American Assimilation, Pluralism, and Subordination," in *American Journal of Sociology* 87 (July 1981): 157-169; Edna Bonacich and John Modell, *The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in the Japanese American Community* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980); Gene M. Levine and Robert C. Rhodes, *The Japanese American Community: A Three Generation Study* (New York: Praeger, 1981); Darrel Montero, *Japanese Americans: Changing Patterns of Ethnic Affiliation Over Three Generations* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980).

9. This is based on the recently released information from the 1980 census as published in *The New York Times*, 20 April 1982.

10. Woodrum, "Assessment of Japanese American Assimilation," 161.

11. See Kurt H. Wolf, ed., *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950), 113.

12. Woodrum, 162.

13. Nandi, *Quality of Life*, 94.

14. Harry H. L. Kitano, *Japanese Americans* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 130.

15. Nandi, 96-122.

16. Bernard P. Wong, *Chinatown* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), 38-39.

17. Ibid., 45-56.

18. Much of the information was derived from various news reports published in Chinatown newspapers in the period of 1977-78. See also Wong, *Chinatown*, 68-72.

19. Erdman B. Palmore, "Ethnophaulisms and Ethnocentrism," in *American Journal of Sociology* 76 (January 1962): 442-445.

20. Barrington Moore, Jr., *Political Power and Social Theory* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 11.

21. According to the released information from the 1980 census, median family income (in thousands) for Asians was $22.1; white $20.8; Hispanic, $14.7; black, $12.6. Level of education is compared in terms of those twenty-five and older who are high school graduates: Asian, 74 percent; white, 69 percent; black, 51 percent; Hispanic, 43 percent. See *New York Times*, 20 April 1982, sec. B6.

22. Kitano, *Japanese Americans*, 2-3.

23. The term "middleman" is defined by Bonacich and Modell as a group that occupies a position not at the bottom of the social structure but somewhere in the middle, typified by a concentration in independent small business. See Paul Wong, "Issei, Nisei, and Sansei: Three Generations of Japanese Americans," in *Contemporary Sociology* 11 (May 1982): 268.

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Caribbean Migration to the United States: Cultural Identity and the Process of Assimilation

Helen I. Safa

Caribbean migration to the United States has assumed alarming proportions recently, particularly with the recent massive influx of Cuban and Haitian refugees to south Florida. While there has been considerable socioeconomic analysis of this phenomenon, little attention has been paid to the possibilities of assimilation of Caribbean migrants into American society and how this relates to questions of cultural identity. Many Caribbean migrants are rejecting assimilation as a goal and choosing instead to maintain their ethnic identity within a framework of ethnic pluralism. They are contributing to a movement of "ethnic revitalization" which has come to characterize much of American sociopolitical life since 1950 (Maingot 1981), but which was especially strong in the 1960s and 1970s.

This resistance to assimilation on the part of some Caribbean migrants is causing great alarm in certain circles. It has led to calls for a complete halt to such immigration and to bilingual education and resettlement programs designed to benefit these new immigrant groups. The assimilationists cannot understand why Caribbean migrants should not make every effort to become Americanized and shed their cultural identity as quickly as possible.

Their resistance or inability to do so is seen as ingratitude or arrogance by some sectors of the dominant society, who see assimilation as the only possible goal not disruptive to the fabric of American life.

This paper is an attempt to explain why many Caribbean migrants have clung to their cultural identity and why assimilation is not seen as a feasible goal. The first section is a discussion of the factors that hinder the assimilation of Caribbean migrants in the United States and that have set them apart from previous migrations, particularly from Europe. It will be seen that Caribbean migrants differ in important respects from these earlier migrants and are also encountering conditions in the United States that cause them to question the validity of the assimilation model.

The second part of this paper attempts to assess the prospects for assimilation of Caribbean migrants and alternatives to such a strategy. Here we deepen the debate over whether the theory of assimilation is really applicable to Caribbean migrants, or whether they might not better be viewed as internal colonies of the United States. Ethnic pluralism is seen as a reaction by internal colonies to continued subordination in the United States in an attempt to establish a new power base rooted in ethnic solidarity.

The third section of this paper examines the formation of cultural identity among Caribbean migrants in the United States through an analysis of the Cuban case. While exceptional in certain aspects, the Cuban case shows how cultural identity is affected not only by the socioeconomic status of migrants and their receptivity in the host society but by their mode of incorporation. Cubans have been characterized as an economic enclave with a high degree of common cultural identity, but this process is also undergoing change as the Cuban community in the United States becomes more heterogeneous and less cohesive.

Thus, the paper attempts to examine ethnic revitalization among Caribbean migrants in the United States by analyzing the relationship between cultural identity and such factors as socioeconomic mobility, the mode of migrant incorporation, and conditions in the host society. As we shall see, the formation of cultural identity is not the same among all Caribbean migrants, who differ not only by country of origin but also by class, racial, and other factors within ethnic groups. Is the maintenance of a strong cultural

identity incompatible with socioeconomic mobility? Must ethnic groups shed their cultural heritage if they wish to enter the American mainstream? We will return to these questions at the end of this paper.

Factors Affecting Assimilation in the United States

In discussing the factors affecting the assimilation of Caribbean migrants in the United States, we shall look both at the characteristics of migrants and conditions in the U.S. economy at this particular historical moment when Caribbean migration has reached its peak. We shall see that there are various factors inhibiting the assimilation of Caribbean migrants into U.S. society, which make them different from previous European immigrants. Particular attention will be paid to the recent Cuban and Haitian refugees in south Florida, to illustrate our analysis.

Let us begin with a definition of the Caribbean used in this paper. The analysis here will be limited largely to the islands of the Greater and Lesser Antilles, which include the English-speaking Indies or Commonwealth Caribbean; the Spanish-speaking islands of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic; and the French Creole-speaking islands of Haiti, Guadeloupe, and Martinique. Most of the islands are now independent, but Guadeloupe and Martinique remain dependencies of France, while the United States retains control over Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands. The enormous political, cultural, and linguistic diversity of the region makes generalizations difficult and precarious, but there are broad historical patterns of colonialism, slavery, the plantation, and dependence on an export economy that are common to the entire area. Comparisons will be limited mainly to the West Indies, Haiti, and the Hispanic Caribbean, from which come the majority of Caribbean migrants to the United States.

The Volume of Caribbean Migration

Although the number of Caribbean migrants is still small compared to migrants from Mexico, the other area of heavy out-migration, the volume has increased rapidly in the postwar period.[1] For example, between 1960 and 1980 the percentage of Hispanic migrants in New York City doubled

to 10.4 percent of the population, while the 1980 census again shows it to be the fastest growing ethnic group. West Indian migration to the United States for the decade 1961-1970 reached almost 500,000, more than three times that of the period 1951-1960 (Marshall 1982, 52).

While Mexican migration has been primarily to California and the Southwest, Caribbean migration has been confined largely to the eastern seaboard, primarily to the areas surrounding New York City and Miami. Last year alone, south Florida admitted approximately 125,000 Cubans as a result of the Mariel boatlift, and 18,000 Haitians, most of whom arrived illegally, claiming status as political refugees (Metropolitan Dade County 1981, 1).[2]

The Cuban migration augmented an existing Cuban population in the United States of about 794,000 people, 63 percent of whom live in Miami (Boswell n.d., 1-2). This figure is constantly growing due to secondary migration from other areas of the United States. Most of the Haitian population of the United States, which is estimated at 400,000, live in New York City. However, most of the recent refugees have settled in Miami, which now has a Haitian population conservatively estimated at 40,000 to 45,000 (Boswell 1982, 19). A large number of Haitians (estimated at 20,000) have also entered the migrant stream as agricultural farm laborers along the eastern seaboard.

The sudden increase in the volume of these refugees, often combined with their status as undocumented aliens, has greatly inhibited their possibilities of assimilation into American society. Even the Cuban community in Miami, which initially welcomed the Mariel refugees, has been overwhelmed by the volume and complexity of the problem. The result has been the continued detention of both Cuban and Haitian refugees in government camps and prisons—refugees whose legal status remains in doubt, or who cannot find families or communities willing to accept them for relocation. This is particularly the case of single men in the Cuban Mariel group, many of whom are reported to have criminal records in Cuba (Bach, et al. 1982).

Another distinguishing feature of Caribbean migration is that it is often circulatory. This is especially true of Puerto Ricans, who are free to come and go as they please. In recent years, return migration to Puerto Rico has more than equalled the number leaving for the United States. However,

Dominicans and other West Indians are also known to circulate, even those who are undocumented aliens. Only Cubans and Haitians are not free to return home because of political conditions in their countries. Circulatory migration also hinders the process of assimilation because it constantly replenishes the stock of migrants with newcomers from the islands, contributing significantly to the maintenance of ethnic identity. In addition, it offers migrants the option of returning home rather than assimilating into American society.

Racial Factors

Racial factors have also impeded the assimilation of Caribbean migrants. A large proportion of these migrants are black or mulatto, entering a predominantly white society with strong racial prejudices. The result has been increasing color consciousness among the Caribbean population, both migrant and non-migrant, which is manifest in various ways. Migrants may try to pass for white and assimilate into the dominant white society. This is easier for migrants who are clearly white, the majority of whom tend to come from the Hispanic Caribbean. West Indians, on the other hand, have tended to distinguish themselves culturally from black Americans rather than to identify with this oppressed minority. In contrast, other Caribbean migrants, both Hispanic and West Indian, have chosen to identify as black, particularly after the rise of the black power movement in the United States in the 1960s, which affected the racial consciousness of migrants as well as islanders.

Thus, race has tended to divide the Caribbean migrant population, even within groups, as studies of race among Puerto Ricans and Cubans have shown. In a recent study in Dade County, many of the recent Mariel refugees from Cuba have felt rejected by their countrymen, and this is particularly true of black and mulatto Cubans, particularly those in detention camps (Metropolitan Dade County 1981, 59). The Mariel population is approximately 20 percent black and therefore differs considerably from previous Cuban migrants, 95 percent of whom are white (ibid., 5). In this and other respects, the Marielitos more closely represent the source Cuban population than ever before (Bach, et al. 1982, 46).

Race undoubtedly represents the most formidable obstacle to assimilation in American society, unlike the other factors discussed here. Race is an ascribed characteristic that permanently sets blacks and other racial minorities apart from the rest of the society. However, there is evidence that race and the recent revived interest in African culture in the Caribbean is playing an increasingly important role in the formation of ethnic identity, both in the Caribbean and among migrants in the United States. The increase in race consciousness and cultural pride in their African heritage appears to be bringing about greater exchange among Caribbean peoples of different linguistic and cultural traditions. While this is most evident among intellectuals interested in the Afro-American cultural heritage, such as Rex Nettleford, Aime Cesaire, Roberto Marques, or Miguel Barnet, it is also manifest in signs of growing solidarity among the mass of Caribbean migrant populations. It is especially evident in the second generation of migrants, who have lost some of their island provincialism and see race as a political strategy for unifying the Caribbean population of the United States.

Social Class of the Migrant Population

Most Caribbean migrants are poor and leave the islands primarily for economic reasons. The poorest group are probably the Haitians, who often arrive by boat with nothing but the clothes on their back. This also reflects the poverty of Haiti, where the per capita income of $260 annually is the lowest in the Western hemisphere. Two-thirds of the rural population, who represent 80 percent of Haiti's people, have annual incomes of $40 (Stepick 1982b, 17).

Fully half of the recent Haitian refugees were engaged in unskilled work or farming in their homeland. This indicates a marked shift toward more rural migrants in recent years, due in part to droughts, hurricanes, and to rural "recruiters" who encourage selling of land to buy passage (estimated to cost as high as $2,000). Education levels among recent Haitian entrants are also low with 5.6 average years of schooling, reflecting their rural origin (Metropolitan Dade County 1981, 16). By contrast, many of the earlier Haitian migrants were urban middle- or upper-class professionals

who settled in New York.

Cubans, on the other hand, enjoy a reputation for being largely middle class. In reality, many Cuban migrants were also working class, particularly those arriving after 1965. Certainly most of the recent migrants from Mariel could be identified as working class. Compared to earlier Cuban migrants, the Mariel group shows a higher percentage who had unskilled or manual jobs in Cuba (71 percent versus 35 percent) and a lower percentage who had professional occupations (9 percent versus 22 percent) (ibid, 5). However, the average educational level of the Mariel entrants is about eighth grade, close to the earlier migrants, and higher than the Haitians (ibid, 16).

As many as 80 to 90 percent of Cuban and Haitian entrants report problems in English (ibid., 65), but this is alleviated for the Cubans by the bilingual nature of the Dade County community. Many Cubans survive well without English, working in and for the Cuban community (Wilson and Portes 1980). For Haitians, the language problem is aggravated by the fact that over half the refugees are illiterate in their own language (Metropolitan Dade County 1981, 65).

Poverty, poor language skills, and low educational and occupational levels are serious impediments to the assimilation of ethnic migrants. Because they are poor and have no knowledge of English, they tend to cluster together in ethnic ghettos, and often have few personal contacts outside the migrant community. Their only contact with the wider society comes through impersonal dealings on the job, in a store or an office. Their ethnic solidarity often serves as a buffer to an impersonal and often hostile world.

Middle-class migrants, by contrast, tend to have more dispersed residential patterns and are therefore much less visible than their poor counterparts, with whom they may have little or no contact. There has been a considerable "brain drain" from the Caribbean with the exodus of professionals such as doctors, nurses, engineers and teachers. Virtually all Caribbean nations have sent professionals to the United States, but they have been much less noticeable than the poor. For example, many middle-class professionals left Jamaica during the Manley government because of inflation, shortage of consumer goods, and other economic problems. Middle-class migrants tend to assimilate

more easily since they have less difficulty finding a job and housing. They may, however, experience severe status dislocation and downward occupational mobility as a result of their move.

Class differences pose a problem to the political effectiveness of the migrant community. Leadership should rest with middle-class migrants, who have education, better knowledge of English, and more experience in dealing with the dominant society. However, many of the middle-class migrants are effectively cut off from the larger, poor migrant community and therefore lack the legitimacy and the support necessary to become effective role models and leaders. This is less true in the case of the Cuban community, where much of the middle-class has continued to live in the Dade County area.

Political Status

Political status is another serious impediment to the political strength of the migrant community. Most migrants cannot vote until they become United States citizens, a long and often arduous process. Caribbean migrants therefore do not constitute a political constituency of any importance, with the notable exception of the Cubans, who play a critical role nationally as well as in south Florida. Some Caribbean migrant groups, though not citizens, have been active in the process of "ethnic bargaining" particularly in matters relating to immigration (Maingot 1981). Though Maingot decries this as diluting the privileges of citizenship of the legal immigrants, it is difficult to see how else these disenfranchised groups can exercise any influence over the policies affecting them. They have learned that in the United States the game of ethnic politics determines much of a group's future, as witness the lobbying by Haitians and their allies for their right to political asylum.

Undocumented aliens and refugees are of course the weakest group politically, and the most vulnerable. President Reagan has recently proposed that undocumented aliens living in the United States as of January 1980, be permitted to apply for status as permanent residents, which—if approved—would clarify considerably their legal status. He has also proposed sanctions against employers who hire undocumented aliens. This measure is bitterly

opposed by Hispanic political organizations because they feel it will lead to discrimination in employment against all Hispanics (or all nonwhites), regardless of their legal status.

The 1980 Refugee Act attempts to clarify the status of refugees as "victims of political repression," not just from Communism, but from all forms of authoritarian regimes. Those supporting the cause of the Haitian refugees have sought to apply this law to their case, arguing that Haitians are political refugees from the repressive Duvalier regime. Nevertheless, the immigration authorities have continued to maintain that Haitians are fleeing for economic, not political reasons. They are afraid that admitting Haitians as refugees would set a precedent, opening the floodgates to immigrants from other authoritarian regimes, such as El Salvador (cf Stepick 1982a, 13). In their attempt to garner greater political strength, Haitians and their advocates sought the support of other political groups, such as the congressional Black Caucus. Here we can see again where race is playing an increasingly important role in the definition and long-range political goals of the Caribbean migrant community.

Despite the limited success of the Haitians, Cubans are the best example of an effective ethnic bloc among Caribbean migrants. Undoubtedly, they are aided by their geographic concentration in the Miami area and by their relatively high socioeconomic level. Although relative newcomers, Maingot (1981, 25) describes how they have been able to gain from the advances of other ethnic minorities and have become a very effective lobby, particularly at the national level. For a long time, their political goals centered on foreign policy and the overthrow of the Castro Government. Recently, however, they have exhibited a greater interest in state and local politics and are well represented in city elective positions in Dade County, where they constitute an important electoral constituency (Jorge and Moncarz 1980, 84).

Cuban effectiveness as a voting bloc has been increased by their naturalization as citizens, which, while resisted at first, has now reached about 40 percent of the Cuban community (Azicri 1982, 61). However, as Maingot (1981, 21-22) writes, "Power was achieved prior to citizenship, not because of it." While citizenship was indicative of their having come to terms with their permanence in the United States, Maingot (ibid., 22) claims that it was a "matter of

strategic choice, not primordial attachment" and implies no loss of ethnic identity. In fact, ethnic identity is intensified by the process of ethnic bargaining at which Cubans have become so adept.

Economic Structure of U.S. Society

In discussing the assimilation of Caribbean migrants into American society, it is also important to look at the nature of the society they are entering at this particular historical moment. Caribbean migrants are entering the United States in large numbers in a period of severe economic crisis and political change, which is bound to have a critical impact on the possibilities of their assimilation.

The economic crisis has brought about high rates of unemployment combined with high rates of inflation. Migrants suffer from these problems more severely than ordinary citizens since they generally occupy the worst jobs and pay exorbitant rents precisely because they are discriminated against and lack the language skills and experience of the native population. Unemployment is severe among recent Cuban and Haitian refugees in Florida. As many as 78 percent of the Cubans and 66 percent of the Haitians in a recent study are reported as unemployed and actively seeking work (Metropolitan Dade County 1981, 38). Housing is also a major problem, with serious overcrowding among Haitians who live with an average of six other people in each household unit, contrasted to three for the Cuban entrant group (ibid., 43).

Migrants, particularly undocumented aliens, are often accused of taking away jobs from American citizens, another factor in the move to restrict immigration and to expel the undocumented aliens from the United States. However, most studies have shown that these groups take jobs that ordinary citizens no longer desire because they pay poorly and/or require heavy manual labor, such as migrant agricultural labor; service jobs in hotels, restaurants and other public establishments; and low-paying factory jobs, such as those in the garment industry (NACLA 1979; Cornelius 1978; 1982). It is estimated that one-third of the garment workers in New York City are undocumented aliens, many of them from the Caribbean (NACLA 1979, 35). In illegal sweatshops in New York City, Los Angeles, and Miami,

undocumented aliens often are forced to work for long hours at less than the minimum wage and under miserable conditions. As undocumented aliens, they have no legal recourse, although a considerable number are now members of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), which is the only union to defend the rights of undocumented aliens in the United States. The rest of the union movement has opposed the entry and legalization of the status of undocumented aliens in the United States because they fear that they bring higher unemployment and deteriorating wages and working conditions.

The high percentage of Caribbean migrants in the garment industry points to the high percentage of women who migrate and are employed in the American labor force. The labor force participation rate of Cuban women, for example, is 55 percent—much higher than the rate for native white Americans. Women from the Caribbean work in the garment industry and other factory employment, in service jobs, and as domestic servants. Domestic servants are primarily undocumented aliens who try to use their employment to find a sponsor who will legalize their stay in the United States and are often exploited by employment agencies seeking this new form of cheap labor. The proportion of women among recent Haitian and Cuban refugees is approximately 30 percent (Boswell 1982, 21). Though the total number of women is low, there is concern over the high birth rate in the Miami Haitian community. A recent study in Florida reported that 52 percent of the Haitian entrant families had a pregnancy during 1980 as opposed to 10 percent of the Cubans (Metropolitan Dade County 1981, 55-56). This figure may be exaggerated due to the nature of the sample, but it is still considerable cause for alarm.

Not only are Haitian households larger in size than Cuban households, but the proportion of working adults within the household is smaller. While the average migrant household reports no more than one working adult, that adult in Haitian households is supporting 4 other nonworking adults, while in Cuban households, he or she supports an average of 2.2 nonworking adults. It is surprising, therefore, that only about half the Cuban entrants report some household incomes from a wage earner, a lower proportion than the 83 percent reported in the Haitian population. Both groups report receiving government aid in some form,

including food stamps, but the proportion of Haitians receiving this aid (31 percent) is less than the proportion of Cuban entrants (48 percent) (ibid., 41).

Contrary to popular belief, most migrants make limited use of benefits, such as unemployment insurance, welfare, or social security, or of social services, such as public hospitals and clinics, public housing and free lunch programs. (NACLA 1979; Cornelius 1978; 1982). With the exception of Puerto Ricans, who as American citizens are entitled to these benefits, many migrants are afraid to jeopardize their status by taking advantage of these services, particularly if they are undocumented aliens. Nevertheless, the cost for such services is often deducted from their paychecks.

In south Florida, social services have been seriously overtaxed by the sudden volume of Cuban and Haitian refugees. Much of these costs has been borne by the state, which adds to the rancor and hostility of the local population. Health problems have been a particularly sensitive issue, particularly among Haitian refugees suffering from various diseases, parasitic infections, and malnutrition. The major brunt of health services has been undertaken by Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, where approximately 20 percent of all children born in 1981 were to Haitian women. Women often seek prenatal care for themselves and infant care in the belief that bearing a child in the United States will facilitate changes in their legal status (Lieberman 1982, 11). As Cornelius (1982, 52) reports for Mexican migrants, medical services are the most utilized by this otherwise fearful population.

Thus, it could be argued than most Caribbean migrants are not taking jobs away from American citizens nor placing a heavy demand on public social services, though there is a need for more research in this area in south Florida. They are hard-working, ambitious people who are primarily interested in earning and saving as much as they can, often with the intention of returning home as soon as possible. A good percentage of their earnings are sent as remittances to their families at home. For these short-term migrants, the temporary visas that President Reagan has recommended for Mexican migrants may represent a solution, distasteful as it may seem to some.

The long-range problem seems to be, however, that the jobs for which Caribbean migrants qualify appear to be

diminishing, at least in the large cities such as New York City and Miami to which they have traditionally gone. The United States has entered a post-industrial phase in which blue collar jobs in factories, agricultural labor, and other heavy manual labor are disappearing due to automation, movement of production abroad, and other factors. Most Caribbean migrants are not prepared for white collar jobs, which require a higher level of education, and especially knowledge of the English language. Thus, the long-term prospects of employment for Caribbean migrants, given their current educational and skill levels, are quite poor.

Summary

What, then, is the future of Caribbean migrants in the United States? Will they be able to overcome the obstacles of race, class, political status and poverty outlined here and assimilate into American society?

A comparison of the Haitian and Cuban migrants in South Florida suggests that the obstacles to assimilation will be far greater among the former than the latter. Haitians suffer from the greatest disadvantages in terms of poverty, race, educational level, language problems and uncertain political status. In addition, the recent Haitian refugees have saturated the absorption capacity of the small and weakly developed Haitian community in Miami, which was already characterized by an extremely rapid turnover in housing, severe overcrowding and unemployment. Many of these recent Haitian migrants may find, and some already have found, an outlet in migrant agricultural labor.

The Cuban Mariel group is more likely to remain in Miami as urbanized wage labor. Although there has been rejection of some black, criminal, and other "undesirable" elements of the Mariel group by the larger Cuban community, the majority will probably be incorporated in the Cuban enclave. The Mariel group is likely, however, to change the image of the Cuban American community in the eyes of the wider American society, as we shall see in Section III.

The barriers to assimilation faced by many Caribbean migrants have caused many of them to question the viability of this as a goal and to turn to ethnic bargaining as a way of competing for political strength and survival in the United States. However, to constitute an effective ethnic bloc,

migrants must maintain a strong sense of cultural identity, which has led to a process of ethnic revitalization among Caribbean migrants. This process will be examined in the next section.

The Prospects for Assimilation and Alternative Modes of Incorporation

The theory of assimilation has been severely criticized recently, particularly in terms of its applicability to racial minorities such as migrants from the Caribbean. The theory was developed primarily on the basis of empirical studies conducted among European immigrants, who did not face racial obstacles to their assimilation into American society. When applied to racial minorities, however, the theory did not work. Why?

Before answering this question, it is necessary to review briefly the theory of assimilation as applied to immigrants to the United States. Assimilation implies the gradual loss of cultural and ethnic identity and the adoption of the values and behavior patterns of the host society. Milton Gordon (1964) has distinguished between cultural and structural assimilation. The former usually precedes the latter, since adoption of the language, norms, and values of the host society (cultural assimilation) is a necessary prerequisite to acceptance as an equal by the members of that society. It was the knowledge of the importance of cultural and structural assimilation for socioeconomic mobility that persuaded European immigrants to shed their cultural heritage and encourage their children to adopt the language, values, and behavior patterns of American society. European immigrants paid a price, but for them it was worth it.

For racial minorities, on the other hand, cultural assimilation did not guarantee structural assimilation. No matter how fervently they adopted the language, values, and behavior patterns of American society, they were still excluded from structural assimilation and socioeconomic mobility on racial grounds.

The most cogent example of the failure of assimilation was black Americans. Imported as slaves and forcibly divided and deprived of much of their cultural heritage, black Americans were long thought to lack a cultural identity apart from the larger dominant white society. Differences

from whites in language, family patterns, religion and values were explained as pathological aberrations due to their marginal position in American society. It was felt they simply had not been given the opportunity to fully adopt the values and behavior patterns of the dominant society. Civil rights and equal opportunity legislation was designed to correct this and allow black Americans to integrate into the mainstream.

The failure of civil rights legislation to assist more than a minority of middle-class black Americans led to a backlash against integrationist theories and practice in the black community. In its place grew up the Black Power movement, which sought to turn the assumed inferiority of blackness into an advantage by proclaiming the unique qualities of Afro-American culture and consciously reconstituting a history and tradition which had long been denied to many black Americans. The Black Power movement sponsored a resurgence of Afro-American culture in the United States in the arts, language, religion, cuisine, and hair and dress styles.

Internal colonialism developed as the theoretical counterpart to the Black Power movement. Developed by scholars like William Tabb (1970) and Robert Blauner (1972), the theory of internal colonialism sought to explain the continued structural exclusion of black Americans on economic grounds. The maintenance of subordinate racial minorities provided the capitalist power structure with a cheap and easily exploitable reserve labor force. The weapons of internal colonialism were both economic and ideological. Racial minorities were kept subordinate economically by denying them access to such social goods as quality education, employment, and housing. Continued denial of access was justified on the grounds that they were inferior to the dominant white society and lacked the cultural capacity to assimilate into American society. Thus, many black Americans were convinced of their own cultural as well as economic inferiority to the dominant white society (Safa 1968). Civil rights legislation addressed the economic issues, while Black Power addressed the ideological question by rejecting the cultural superiority of the dominant society and proclaiming a separate ethnic identity.

The Black Power movement led to a new racial pride that many ethnic minorities, particularly from the Caribbean,

sought to emulate. Many rejected assimilation as a goal and strove instead to conserve their own cultural heritage as an ethnic group in American society. They tried to replace the ideology of assimilation with one of ethnic pluralism, which respects the cultural heritage of distinct ethnic groups, rather than asking them to blend into a "melting pot." (cf. Gordon 1964). The change also implies a move away from an emphasis on individual mobility as a mechanism of assimilation into American society, toward a focus on collective strategies that would foster ethnic solidarity and cohesion. Those groups which had been denied the possibility of structural assimilation now also denied the validity of cultural assimilation and consciously strove to maintain ethnic institutions that could serve as a power base in American society. The era of ethnic revitalization had arrived.

Among migrants from the Hispanic Caribbean, ethnic pride is manifest primarily in the emphasis on the retention of the Spanish language along with other cultural items such as music, dance and food. The ideological value of the struggle is most clearly evident in the intense debate over bilingual education. Hispanics fought for bilingual education so that their Spanish-speaking children would not be placed at a disadvantage and could learn and appreciate their native language. Opposition to bilingual education came chiefly from sectors of American society who continued to believe that ethnic groups must shed their cultural heritage and adopt the language and customs of the dominant culture. They have recently won a major battle through President Reagan's cut in the budget for bilingual education programs. The assimilationist group is again in the ascendency.

Not all Hispanics or other Caribbean migrants subscribe to ethnic pluralism either. Migrants who do not face the barriers to assimilation outlined earlier, who are white, middle-class, and fluent in English, can more easily assimilate and stand to gain little from identifying with their less fortunate countrymen. For them, the price to be paid for the continued maintenance of ethnic identity is too great, because it may detract from their success in public life. Thus, Richard Rodriguez, a Mexican-American "scholarship boy" educated at Stanford, Berkeley, Columbia, and the Warburg Institute, London, in a recently published autobiography

that is highly critical of bilingual education, writes:

> Today I hear bilingual educators say that children lose a degree of 'individuality' by becoming assimilated into public society.... But the bilingualists simplistically scorn the value and necessity of assimilation. They do not seem to realize that there are *two* ways a person is individualized. So they do not realize that while one suffers a diminished sense of *private* individuality by becoming assimilated into public society, such assimilation makes possible the achievement of *public* individuality. (Rodriguez 1982, 26).

But what is public individuality? Even Rodriguez recognizes that for a scholar with his credentials, the individuality achieved in public life is often "impersonal" and "tenuous." What of those Mexican-Americans less fortunate than he, for whom public life represents only subordination in low paying, menial jobs? Would he deny them the refuge of an intimate family and community life based on ethnic ties? His own poignant description of the pain of separation from his family and community and his consequent personal estrangement is a powerful indictment against the very policies Rodriguez purports to uphold. He may feel his sacrifice was socially necessary, but many—ethnics or not—may wonder if it was worth the price.

The knowledge that success and upward mobility are only open to a few and serve to weaken class and ethnic identification in the United States has led most Hispanic scholars to reject the path Rodriguez has chosen. At least verbally, they continue to insist on the maintenance of ethnic identity through programs of bilingual and bicultural education and other measures. The importance of class issues in the formation of ethnic identity is clearly evident in the intense debate over bilingualism now raging in the Puerto Rican community in the United States. The debate is less over the need for bilingual education (on which most agree) than over the nature of bilingualism in the Puerto Rican community on the mainland. Is code switching (using Spanish and English interchangeably) evidence of deculturation or of a failure to learn either Spanish or English adequately; or does it represent an "expansion of communication of expressive potential" (Flores, et al. 1981, 200)? Does migration lead inevitably to moral and cultural deterioration, as Puerto

Rican writers such as René Marqués suggest, or can it lead to a new form of cultural identity, rooted in the native culture but not merely a transplant? How is this new form of cultural identity manifested in linguistic practice and artistic production?

Puerto Rican cultural identity is distinguished by two important factors: (1) Puerto Rico's colonial relationship to the United States, which has imposed a strong Americanization process on the island itself since the occupation in 1898 and has led to massive proletarianization of the population; and (2) the circulatory nature of Puerto Rican migration, with constant new replenishments coming from the island while others are returning in increasing numbers. Therefore, Puerto Rican culture on the mainland has been difficult to distinguish from that on the island, and some would still question the validity of such a distinction. However, culture is a dynamic process, and it is clear that with the development of a second, and even a third and fourth, generation of Puerto Ricans in the United States, there is emerging a distinct "Nuyorican" subculture that borrows heavily from black Americans both in language and behavior patterns. Much of the literature and other forms of artistic expression exhibits an increased awareness of African culture, in opposition to both European (Spanish and English) traditions, and stresses the need for racial unity noted earlier among Afro-Caribbean writers. Thus, Laviera, a Nuyorican poet, writes:

> a blackness in spanish
> a blackness in english
> mixture-met on jam sessions in central park,
> there were no differences in
> the sounds emerging from inside.
> (ibid., 205)

Thus, it would appear that assimilation of Caribbean migrants is not entirely dependent on acceptance by the larger society. In a sense, many Caribbean migrants have consciously rejected the goal of assimilation and have sought instead a new identity that sets them apart from the American mainstream. Nor are they simply transplants of the island culture, as the Nuyorican writers tell us. The island "remains a key source of reference and collective

identity, a wellspring of resistance to the arrogant workings of pervasive cultural subordination." (ibid., 209). But they recognize that Puerto Rico, or Jamaica, or any other island is no longer a refuge, as it was for the first generation, and that they must forge a new cultural identity based on life in the United States. This new cultural identity shares a strong element of racial pride, ethnic consciousness, and rejection of conventional American middle-class norms. It seeks to promote socioeconomic mobility through ethnic solidarity and collective struggle rather than through individual achievement. Ethnic revitalization is thus more than seeking roots in the native culture. It is a struggle to forge a new identity based on shared elements from both the United States and native culture.

Cultural Identity and the Cuban Community in the United States

Before concluding this analysis of Caribbean migration, it is important to look at the Cuban case for what it reveals about the process of assimilation and cultural identity. Cuban Americans differ from other Hispanic migrants previously discussed, such as the Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans, in several important ways: (1) Cubans entered the United States primarily as political refugees rather than for economic reasons; (2) they are largely white and middle-class in origin and brought with them capital, skills, and other assets that aided in their socioeconomic mobility in the United States; and (3) they are more concentrated geographically than other migrant groups, constituting over half the population of Miami and Hialeah (Wilson and Portes 1980, 304).

All of these factors tend to favor the rapid and relatively easy assimilation of Cubans into American society. Their flight from the Communist regime of Fidel Castro led to much greater receptivity on the part of the American public and government, which took full advantage of their exodus to try to discredit and delegitimize the Castro regime. As political refugees, they were also given considerable state assistance not extended to economic migrants, such as resettlement and cash assistance, special educational programs (including retraining for professionals), college tuition loans, and relaxed citizenship requirements. Bilin-

gual education programs for Cubans were instituted in Florida as early as 1960 and served as prototypes for programs in other areas of the country (Pedraza-Bailey 1982, 88). Pedraza-Bailey has also documented the importance of this state assistance in the economic success story of the Cuban refugees.

The Cuban community in the United States faces few of the obstacles to assimilation outlined in the first section of this paper. The earliest wave of migration in the early 1960s was overwhelmingly white and middle-class, and entered the United States in a period of expanding economic opportunities. In fact, Cubans are generally credited with the revitalization of the Miami economy, which had begun to stagnate at that time. Thus, their attachment to the Miami area is due not only to climate, its proximity to Cuba, and prior knowledge of the area, but to the fact that they discovered there an economic niche which they could exploit to the fullest. This comparative advantage accentuated the process of geographic concentration.

Wilson and Portes (1980) have argued that the mode of incorporation of the Cuban community into the United States differs both from assimilation and internal colonialism and is best characterized as an "economic enclave" similar to that developed by such groups as the Jews, Japanese, and more recently by the Chinese and Koreans. While other immigrant groups, both European and racial minorities, served primarily as a source of cheap labor, economic enclaves tend to be characterized by a strong entrepreneurial element, beginning in the first generation (connoting an obvious class difference). These entrepreneurs built up small enterprises that tend to employ fellow migrants and serve primarily the needs of the ethnic community. This economic advance is followed by consolidation and growing political influence in successive generations. Economic mobility in this case does not necessarily presuppose cultural integration since the enclave tends to develop a whole gamut of institutions to preserve cultural identity and defend it against external pressure. The enclave resists assimilation because it recognizes that the loss of cultural identity and geographic dispersion would weaken the resources and the economic viability of the ethnic community in a hostile society bent on reducing it to a source of cheap labor (Portes 1980, 13).

The evidence to support the enclave thesis in the Cuban case is impressive. In the Miami area there are Cuban firms in construction, sugar, cigar making, manufacturing, finance, and a variety of service sectors (Wilson and Portes 1980). In a study conducted in 1979 by Portes and others, it was found that over half of the sample were self-employed or working in Cuban-owned or -managed firms six years after their arrival in the United States (Portes, et al. 1982, 19). The size of Cuban firms has also tended to increase and in the 1970s they have moved from small retail establishments to larger manufacturing plants (Jorge and Moncarz 1980, 67).

On the other hand, there is also evidence of increased socioeconomic heterogeneity in the Cuban community. Most of the entrepreneurs arrived in the first waves of migration, and the highest incomes are still associated with those arriving between 1960 and 1962 (ibid., 73). Even some of the middle- and upper-class Cuban migrants experienced downward occupational mobility because of problems of language, recertification, discrimination, and age (ibid., 53-60).

The heterogeneity of the Cuban community increased with successive waves of migration, which brought increasing numbers of the working class to the United States, some of whom settled in the Union City-West New York area of New Jersey as well as in Miami. Added to this has been the formation of a second generation, who have not always followed the success story of their parents. As a result, Jorge and Moncarz (1980, 55) argue for the bipolar nature of the Cuban occupational structure. Based on the 1978 census, they estimate that 31 percent of the Cubans are presently in higher occupational groups, such as professionals, technicians and managers, while over 43 percent are part of the lower strata comprised of operatives, laborers, and service workers. Portes' longitudinal study in Miami also reports increasing economic differentiation (Portes, Clark, Lopez 1982, 20).

The heterogeneity of the Cuban community is also evident in measures of assimilation into American society. The study by Portes, Clark, and Lopez (1982) in Miami reports increased residential dispersion in Anglo and mixed neighborhoods and high exposure to mass media (though often in Spanish) correlated with a good knowledge of American society as measured by such matters as familiarity with political figures and institutions (ibid., 4-9). Knowledge of

English remains surprisingly low, even after years in this country. This study also reports an increased perceived level of discrimination against Cubans in American society, particularly among the better informed and fluent English speakers (ibid., 15). These data suggest that initially favorable attitudes toward American society may be waning with time, particularly as the Cuban community loses its privileged status in American society. Hostility toward Cubans in the United States is also increasing, as witnessed by the recent rejection of bilingual education in a referendum in Dade County (Portes 1980, 19).

As Portes (1980) suggests, the Cuban community is in the process of transformation from a group of political exiles to an ethnic group. Their definition as political exiles rested on their flight from and opposition to the Castro regime. Although they have been very effective in preventing any rapprochement between the American and Cuban governments, the hope of return to Cuba has faded and with it the unity brought about by common opposition to Castro. Political differences were intensified by the Dialogue, which permitted some Cuban exiles to return to Cuba to visit family, and by the political radicalization of some younger members of the community into defenders of the revolution (Azicri 1982). Many of these younger Cubans suffered an identity crisis that they could only resolve by returning to Cuba (at least for a visit) and reconciling themselves with the Castro regime.

Thus, cultural identity has also taken on different meanings in the Cuban community. For some, it represents close ties with present-day Cuba and acceptance, if not ardent defense, of the Castro government. The older generation, however, remains largely bitterly opposed to the present government and continues to cling to an older, prerevolutionary cultural tradition that they attempt to maintain. They refuse to recognize themselves as an ethnic minority in the United States and continue to think of themselves as political refugees. This may be one reason that they have failed to develop institutions to defend Cuban interests as an ethnic minority. Portes (1980, 17) notes this failure but attributes it to political weakness, manifest in the lack of response by the Cuban community to the negative image of the recent Mariel refugees portrayed in the media. However, this lack of response can also be attributed to the rejection of

the Marielitos by the Cuban community that knew a new wave of working class Cubans would consolidate their image as an ethnic minority in American society.

Conclusion

The transformation of the Cuban community in the United States raises interesting questions regarding the relationship between cultural identity, the process of assimilation, and socioeconomic mobility. If assimilation is predicated on the adoption of the host culture, then resistance to assimilation through the maintenance of a strong cultural identity would seem to preclude socioeconomic mobility. This is because mobility was thought to depend upon adoption of the values and behavior patterns of mainstream American society.

To varying degrees, this ethic of assimilation and mobility was adopted and practiced by earlier European immigrants to the United States. It has been rejected recently by some racial minorities, led by black Americans, who recognized that cultural assimilation did not necessarily guarantee structural assimilation or acceptance by and access to the dominant white society. In its place they advocated a policy of ethnic pluralism that allowed each group to maintain its cultural identity and rejected the superiority of the dominant culture. Ethnic cohesion might give them increased political leverage, which could be used in the process of ethnic bargaining for the benefit of the community. Thus, ethnic groups bargained for increased state assistance for programs such as bilingual education, housing, job training, as well as for immigration reform. While these might benefit the community collectively, the goals of ethnic pluralism were ideological as well as economic. Pluralism sought to reinstitute a sense of dignity and self-worth to oppressed minorities who had long been told they were inferior to the white society. On the other hand, it rejected members of ethnic groups who, like Richard Rodriguez, put success first and chose individual achievement over collective cohesion and identity.

The enclave theory as developed by Portes poses a third alternative. Through enclaves it is possible to retain a strong sense of cultural identity without sacrificing individual socioeconomic mobility. In fact, the enclave is dependent on

continued ethnic cohesion to sustain its strength and defend it from hostility on the part of the dominant society. However, this cohesion becomes increasingly difficult to maintain with the passage of time and the increasing heterogeneity of the ethnic community. The enclave may remain, but inevitably some of the more upwardly mobile sectors of the community will assimilate into American society and cease to identify primarily with the ethnic group. The data on residential dispersion, out-marriage, naturalization, and occupational change in the Cuban community indicate this may be taking place. Though the success of the first generation has been predicated on ownership and employment in Cuban firms, it is reported that their children are not necessarily following in their footsteps (Jorge and Moncarz 1980, 69). The real test of the enclave theory rests with the second generation. It may not necessarily be followed by the consolidation Portes has predicted on the basis of similar enclave groups.

In a sense, the Cuban community has followed a very different trajectory from other Hispanic minorities in the United States. Second generation Puerto Ricans and Chicanos experienced an ethnic revitalization as they shed the traditional cultural heritage of their parents and sought a new cultural identity based on life in the United States. These are the groups that are most receptive to bilingual education and other programs designed to bolster the strength of the ethnic community. This new cultural identity is not yet evident in the Cuban community, although it may be a question of time. The Cuban community arrived more recently and is only now being subject to the proletarianization and exploitation long suffered by other Hispanic minorities. Thus, the fate of the Mariel refugees and other less fortunate Cuban migrants will help determine whether they also react with the ethnic revitalization characteristic of the other Hispanic groups.

Critics like Maingot (1981) assert that ethnic revitalization threatens to increase divisiveness in American society and to produce a backlash in the dominant society. Yet the emphasis on new forms of cultural creativity and identity has already enriched our lives in many ways—from salsa music to comida criolla, from West Indian street festivals and Puerto Rican parades to the writings of Piri Thomas and Paule Marshall. Ethnic pluralism encourages the formation

of a more culturally diverse society from which we all stand to gain.

Endnotes

1. The term "migrant" used in this paper is intended to cover immigrant, refugee, entrant, undocumented alien, and other more specific terms applied to persons entering the United States from the Caribbean. Migrant is preferred to immigrant because Puerto Ricans, as United States citizens, are not immigrants, nor are legally undocumented aliens and refugees.

2. Much of the statistical data in this section is drawn from a study conducted in 1981 by the Office of the County Manager of Dade County among three hundred Cubans selected from cash assistance applicants, fifty men in the Dade County jail, and one hundred Haitians (fifty receiving refugee assistance and fifty social service treatments). Although the sample is small and restrictive, it offers a basis for comparison of these two recent groups, particularly among the most needy.

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Race and Education: Interpreting British Policies in the 1960s and 1970s

John M. Raynor

In 1974, the Central Policy Review Staff reported to the then Labor Government on the state of race relations in Britain. In that report there appeared the following paragraph:

> There are uncomfortable parallels between the situation of Britain's coloured population and that of the Catholics in Northern Ireland. For 50 years, British governments have condoned discrimination and deprivation in Ulster, and in the end Ulster blew up in her face. We believe, not only for reasons of social justice but also to preserve social stability and order that more should be done to deal with the problems of race relations in this country.[1]

The report was never published.

1980 and 1981 saw the first race riots in English cities since 1958, with violence on the streets of Bristol, London, Liverpool, Manchester, and on a lesser scale in several other cities. Britons should not have been surprised, but they were. A combination of a deepening economic recession that has put over 3 million out of work; concentration of the poor and disadvantaged in the older industrial cities; community

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reaction to daily frustration and humiliation; and, finally, policing of an increasingly strong-armed kind, led many of the urban poor, particularly the young urban blacks, to take to the streets. Not to have seen the writing on the wall (and not to have acted to prevent such violence) indicates social myopia on a grand scale; successive governments and policymakers had repeatedly been warned that such a series of events would take place. The parallel with the American experience is close, if not exact.

Over the last twenty years British governments have introduced legislation on race relations that has faced two ways. Legislation has been introduced to control immigration whose effect has been to successively define *blackness* as a problem, to legitimize harassment by officials of government departments (immigration, police, health, and social security) and to help fan a popular racism. At the same time, these governments have introduced contradictory policies that aim to reduce discrimination and to promote good race relations and social harmony. The policies that have emerged in the field of immigration control have resulted from popular pressure, and they have been ill-considered, panic-stricken, and racist, in the sense that they distinguish categories on the basis of color.[2] The policies in the social area that aimed to produce good race relations have been liberal policies, but they also have been confused, faint-hearted, and of the "too little, too late" variety.

This paper is in two parts. The first part reviews the politics of race as it has emerged since the early 1960s. Such a description, however brief, is essential for understanding the part that education is expected to play in the achievement of a multiracial society. Before examining the issue of race in Britain, it is well, I think, to take an even broader look at the mass migratory movements in Europe since World War II and the revival of ethnicity as a political phenomenon.

Mass Migration and Ethnic Revival

Since the mid-1950s Europe has witnessed a mass northward movement of millions of low-skilled workers from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and other countries in the Mediterranean basin to the industrial centers of Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland. West

Germany has over 4 million foreign workers, or 10 percent of the total population; France has 4 million, too, making up 7 percent of its labor force; Switzerland with 1 million foreign workers finds itself with 16 percent of its total population and 25 percent of its labor force made up of nonnationals; Britain has 7 percent of its total population (or more if you include children of minorities born in Britain) from outside the British isles. While no two sets of figures agree about the total migrant labor force in Europe, it is certainly in excess of 10 million, and if grouped together, would form the seventh largest nation in Europe.[3]

The migrants in Europe are concentrated mainly in the industrial regions, are generally manual workers, and are overrepresented in the "dirty" industries of metal, plastics, rubber, asbestos, as well as in domestic labor and hotel work. They work unsociable hours for low rates of pay in industries and services that are unable to recruit indigenous labor. In no small measure has the European economic boom of the 1950s and early 1960s rested on this reserve army of labor. The changing economic climate in Europe from the late 1960s, when the boom ended and economic recession began, shifted attention away from accepting the economic benefits of immigration to calculating its economic and social costs and led to a shift in policy towards tighter immigration control.

The British experience of mass migration was at first distinctively different from that of other European countries. The British Nationality Act of 1948 permitted any citizen of the British Commonwealth to enter Britain freely, to find work, to bring their families, and to settle down. The immigration into Britain was encouraged by both employers and the government, and the immigrants came from former British colonies and dependencies to find work and to settle. First, from the Caribbean and Guyana, then from India and Pakistan, and finally, though in smaller numbers, from African countries, and from Malaysia and Hong Kong. They had full rights of citizenship in the social, political, and legal spheres.

The European experience was somewhat different, being short-term, with immigrants dependent on having work vouchers and enjoying few legal or political rights. What has happened since 1962 and the passing of the Commonwealth Immigration Act is that Britain has moved steadily towards

strict immigration control and the inauguration of a contract labor system for immigrants. At the same time, the increasing settlement of foreign workers in Germany, for instance, suggests that there is now a very close similarity in policy between the two countries.

What this movement has done over the years is to put back onto the political agenda of Europe the issues of ethnicity and race that had been neglected in the post-World War II settlement. Ethnic issues and the recognition of minority rights, which had been so important before World War I, had been resolved, it was believed, by the Versailles treaty, while the issue of race was thought to be ended forever when the full horrors of the Holocaust were discovered.[4] That is not the case in the last quarter of this century. Few countries, either in a major or minor form, have escaped ethnic conflict, and racism is a growing phenomenon in many countries. Britain has had to contend within the last decade with the growing demands of its own indigenous territorial minorities—the Scotish and Welsh nationalists—and a sectarian civil war in Ulster, as well as with a problem of racism.

Many dilemmas are faced by the modern state when confronted with increasingly vocal ethnic minority claims. The goals of modern states typically embrace industrialization, secularism, and nationhood, together with a degree of subscription to a common culture, and (in democratic societies) equality, justice, and fair treatment for all. At the same time ethnic minorities may make demands for special recognition and treatment on the grounds of their culture, language, religion, and place in the labor market. The balancing of policies that promote cultural diversity and mobilize national sentiment is an extremely difficult, though not impossible, task.

At the same time, one can detect a whole range of strategies adopted by ethnic minorities to cope with the situation they find themselves in. These range from a narrow "isolationism," through "accommodationism" (by assimilating to the host society through job skills and education), to ethnic "mobilization." What we are seeing in Britain at the moment is a growing radicalism and mobilization in some black minority groups arising from their alienation from the host society and its values, their refusal to be made scapegoats for the wider society's ills, their insistence on greater control of their communities, their

demands for alternative education, and their forging links to other radical social movements in order to combat inequality and racism.

Racism in Britain

British policies on race since the 1960s have been Janus-like. Janus was the Roman God, it will be remembered, who was distinguished by having two faces; one face looked outwards while the other looked inwards. As God of all public gates and doorways he was the key that opened doors to some and closed them to others. Janus was also the name of the stick that porters used to drive away all those who had no right to cross the threshold. Ovid relates that Janus's name was originally Chaos.

The metaphor of Janus is an entirely appropriate one for understanding British policies on race over the last twenty years, for British policies have been contradictory—looking two ways—and have generated a degree of chaos. One set of policies has looked outwards, concentrating on the control of immigration, and was rationalized on the grounds that more immigrants would create a greater racism. The other set has looked inwards towards the reduction of discrimination and the promotion of improved race relations. The former policies have proved stronger than the latter, and it can be argued that they have not reduced racism but rather have heightened race consciousness, and thus have made the efforts to produce a fairer and more just society all the more difficult to achieve. With few honorable exceptions, blame for this situation can be shared by successive Tory and Labor governments, the trade union movement, employers of labor, and the popular press.[5] Over the last twenty years the race issue has revealed limitations and shortcomings in both society and the political system.

Currently, race has a deeper effect in Britain than differences in religion, culture, or place of origin. A traditional strand of xenophobia has been manifested in British society not only in a series of stereotypes about foreigners but also in their treatment. For example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Irish and the Jews who emigrated to Britain were received as hostilely as any of the recent arrivals from the New Commonwealth. But in the case of black immigrants, the old imperial links that bound

the former colonies to the mother country have "ensured the existence of a reservoir of popular racism."[6] Though legally equal before the law, the disposition has been to treat black citizens as different, as inferior, and as a problem. The polite xenophobia of the British citizen has been strengthened recently not only by believed threats to working-class job security but also by crypto-Nazi organizations like the National Front, encouraged by a few cynical politicians. Britain is not a racist society, but undoubtedly racism exists to a marked and significant degree.

An examination of the policies on race also draws attention to limitations in the British political system. It is arguable that from 1916 through the 1960s there was a consensus in British political life predicated on an honest brokerage between the state and the people. That consensus endured despite popular dissent during World War I, labor unrest in the 1920s, economic depression and unemployment in the 1930s, and the post-World War II social reforms. The whole period was one in which the avoidance of crises became a priority for successive governments, be it in the areas of unemployment, wages, conditions of living, public order, or immigration; and this social peace was achieved by the incorporation of organized labor on the one hand and organized capital on the other into what was increasingly a pluralist and corporate state. It can also be argued that the alternate gratification of these collectivities has been at the expense of individuals and minorities.[7] This sharing of power by labor and capital was accompanied by the decline of political parties, the abandonment of ideology, a lack of resolve by governments to invoke their authority, and the governments' desire to appease. It was a political culture in which no group felt so deprived by the operation of the system that it had to move outside the framework of existing institutions to struggle for its demands.

The race issue came to prominence in the 1960s when the consensus began to crumble. It has been an issue that has fallen outside the demands of both organized labor and capital, and the policies that emerged were therefore *ad hoc*, and vacillating, falling far short of offering reassurance and confidence. For example, it can be argued that the introduction of liberal legislation during the Labor Government of 1974-79, such as the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act, the 1975 Employment Protection Act, and the 1976 Race Relations

Act—valuable though these have been—was the price paid by a government that wanted to pursue a limited modernization without making any basic changes in Britain's class and social relations. Such legislation was passed in return for the assurance that Britain's dominant economic order would continue.

Looking One Way: Immigration Control

It is hard to arrive at any other conclusion than that the developing policy for immigration control has been racist in effect and probably in intent. A series of legislative acts—the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts of 1962 and 1968, the Immigration White Paper of 1965, the Immigration Act of 1971,* and the Nationality Bill of 1981—have together categorized immigrants on the basis of color, have reduced rights, and have effectively closed the country down to further immigration. As two critics put it, "Constant hammering away at immigration control was precisely the strategy needed to win over the crypto-racialists.... It could be presented as not racial in character at all but merely motivated by a concern for the total population in this crowded little island."[9] By concentrating on stemming the flow of ethnic minority people coming into the country in order, so it is argued, to achieve a balanced population and to avoid swamping communities, immigration control has helped fan both manifest and latent racist sentiments. On the grounds of political expediency, a bipartisan policy has been pursued by the two major political parties, each attempting to outbid the other in the toughness of its immigration policies in office and in the liberality of them when in opposition.

Looking the Other Way: Discrimination and Disadvantage

Complementary to the policies on immigration control have been those that aimed to reduce discrimination and disadvantage and to promote a greater equality of opportunity.

Discrimination has been tackled through the Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968, and 1976. These different acts have been aimed at getting rid of discrimination in employment

and housing and at abolishing incitement to racism through public statement. To help achieve these ends, quasi-governmental agencies have been established, like the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Commission for Racial Equality, which have powers of investigation and are able to bring transgressors to court, but rarely do.

Parallel to the antidiscrimination legislation have been attempts to tackle the issue of urban deprivation with which the ethnic minorities are inextricably linked by virtue of their residence. Here again, there have been a number of initiatives—the Urban Aid Program (1968), the Community Development Program (1969), the Inner Area Studies, and (following the White Paper of 1978) the establishment of the Inner Area Program Authorities

The difficulty is that while these actions point in the right direction, they have been minimally funded and mild in intention, when what was needed was more forceful political action.

A further dilemma has arisen because the policies that deal with the immigrant issue have become submerged in the policies that deal with disadvantage. At a theoretical level, explanations such as "culture of poverty" or "cycles of deprivation" have been thought to incorporate ethnic minority families, and in education this has led to treating the immigrant child as similar to the low-achieving, indigenous child. As a result, immigrants and their children have not received educational help specifically aimed at improving their situation. Race relations legislation may be explicitly egalitarian, but plans based on egalitarian principles do not carry far in a society that is so markedly unequal.

Even if the government principles on racial equality are the right ones, and the strategies for achieving these principles are appropriate, there is need for policy coordination if what is proposed and legislated is to be effective. This unfortunately has not been the case. After twenty years of concern about the race issue in Britain, the Parliamentary Home Affairs Committee commented:

> There is no effective coordination at Ministerial level for government policies on racial disadvantage. If there is a Cabinet Committee or its equivalent it is ineffective; if there is not such a committee one should be established.... Provision should be made at official level for

> interdepartmental coordination for combating racial disadvantage.[10]

Of the fifty-seven recommendations made by the Committee to improve the situation only two have been accepted.[11] Not acted on were recommendations on the establishment of a body to oversee research into race relations; on the creation of a multiracial education unit; on the establishment of a unit for dealing with racial disadvantage; on a new loan scheme for ethnic minority businesses; and on the provision of ethnic monitoring of employment. The principle of a multiracial society was reaffirmed by the Committee but on the issue of coordination of departments of government, the conclusion was that it should be left as it is on the grounds that to make one department the coordinator of all others would involve interfering in other departments' work.

Twenty years ago, the feelings of the British people on the race issue were hesitant, ambiguous, and confused. Nevertheless, there existed a reservoir of goodwill, and the traditional feelings of fair play, tolerance, and equality of treatment could have been appealed to. Since that time the position has worsened. In part this is due to economic and social reasons, but above all it has been due to the vacillating policies of governments and their refusal to exert their authority and give a clear and unambiguous lead. This lacuna has led to a growth of racial prejudice, and the deterioration in public attitudes has been spectacular. Nevertheless, there is still a genuine antiracism movement in Britain that seeks every opportunity to mount public pressure through political, statutory, and voluntary agencies both to help create a genuinely more equal society and to fight against racist tendencies.

Gunnar Myrdal in his classic study, *The American Dilemma*, made a distinction between what he called the higher and lower valuations.[12] The tension between these valuations in respect to the American Negro was between the higher valuations that were influenced by and predicated upon the American creed and Christian precepts and the lower valuations where economic and social jealousies, prejudice against persons, considerations of prestige and conformity, and impulses and habits dominated an individual's outlook. That distinction between higher and lower valuations is a useful one for considering the problems in

Britain today.

What has become increasingly apparent is that the effectiveness of the liberal-democratic ideology that directed the pragmatic consensus has proved insufficient to deal with the countervailing forces of racism. That ideology, which is compounded of two elements—a conservative belief in common citizenship and a socialist belief in the brotherhood of man irrespective of race, color or creed—found common ground in the principles of tolerance, justice, and equity. However, these different elements also shared a skeptical attitude toward the belief that desired changes of attitudes can flow from legislation. The racist lobby knew what it wanted and how to go about getting it; people operating within the liberal-democratic tradition were more vague about what they wanted and how to achieve it. When social policies in respect to race relations in Britain are examined, they can be seen to cover every possible kind of response from institutional racism at one extreme through confusion to hasty *ad hoc* actions and disjointed departmental incrementalism at the other.[13]

If there has been a lack of an overall strategy on race relations in order to achieve racial equality, it also needs emphasizing that the admission of the white working class to full equality has also been slow, disjointed, and halting in its progress. Nevertheless, the search for a more dynamic strategy is urgent if the plight of the second and third generations of black British is not to worsen.

The rioting in British cities in the summer of 1981 was a deeply shocking event in what is, after all, still a reasonably civilized and fair society. The report by Lord Scarman on the riots in Brixton of 10-12 April 1981 was a wise and calm judgment in the best liberal-democratic tradition.[14] It located the causes of the riots in a complex of reasons that are part social, part economic, and part political. The report scrutinized closely the policing patterns of the area; the training and tactics of the police; and their lack of community relations and accountability. It called for a better coordinated policy from the government in order to deal with the problems of racial disadvantage and for a more vigorous effort in enforcing the law against racial discrimination.

The *Scarman Report* rejects the idea of the existence of an institutional racism in Britain that "knowingly discriminates against black people." It is hard to justify that

assertion on two grounds. The first is that Britain does openly discriminate against black people through the immigration laws. Secondly, as U. Prasha has pointed out, institutional racism does not require a conscious policy that "knowingly discriminates; it is sufficient if institutions and practices operate to the detriment of black people by reason of the assumptions on which they are based."[15] Further, even if institutional racism does not exist, the evidence suggests that successive governments have been guilty of creating a climate in which the "phenomenon" of racism is allowed to flourish.

Disturbing evidence exists that the lessons learned from the *Scarman Report* are already being forgotten, particularly by the police. The recent decision to break down some of the categories of offenses—particularly the category of violence against the person, which only accounts for 3 percent of all reported crime—by color of assailant is one small indication of the way racist assumptions have been allowed to intrude into public discussion.[16] The fanning of public anxiety by the popular press over "muggings" (which account for 1 percent of all crime), the publication of dubious statistics on "black" crime by the metropolitan police, the cry for a stronger police force that is free from political and community accountability, the demand for the return of the death penalty, have been little short of a disgrace. This kind of orchestrated movement has made the task of achieving good race relations exceedingly difficult.

Multicultural Education Policies in the 1960s and 1970s

A survey of the developing educational policies and priorities over the last two decades in respect to ethnic minorities can only be a cause of grave disquiet. The last twenty years can be characterized as a period in which there has been uncertainty about goals, inconsistency, and disjointedness in strategy, and, above all, slowness to recognize the wholly new situation that was brought about by the presence of so many ethnic minority children in the schools. The position has been compounded by the assumption that the immigrant child is a "problem." As a consequence, attention has been turned away from a scrutiny of society or school or teachers toward the child itself.

Having said that, it is essential to recognize that in Britain educational decision making is decentralized, and decentralization does lead to a diffusion of responsibility. Education is statutorily provided by local authorities whose main power is to distribute resources provided by a central government, which, by and large, does not intervene in local authorities' arrangements so long as they fall broadly within agreed national patterns and provision. In practice, curriculum decisions have devolved on headteachers and their staffs, though there have been indications of late that the Department of Education and Science has wished to take more initiatives in that area.

Too, a further point needs to be made regarding the extent to which educational policy is part of a wider social policy pursued by governments and therefore suffused with the particular set of ideas that the political parties in power wish to pursue. Educational strategies form only a part of a broad set of strategies that advance in disjointed, incremental steps. The Department of Education and Science works within this broad set of ideas and, in addition to its statutory and financial functions, affects the educational climate of ideas through the publication of circulars, through surveys, through the issuance of discussion papers, and through the activities of Her Majesty's Inspectors for Schools.

The 1960s

In the decade of the 1960s, the policy in respect to the education of the increasing number of immigrant children can best be described as being uncoordinated: an uncharitable view would argue that there was was no plan at all.[17]

The lack of coordination of policy in those years reflected the viewpoint that the immigrant child should be assimilated into the British way of life as quickly as possible. There is disagreement as to how far this policy was meant to go. On the one hand the Home Office issued a report that in one part stated:

> A national system must aim at producing citizens who can take their place in society.... If their parents were brought up in another culture or another tradition children should be encouraged to respect it, but a national system cannot be expected to perpetuate the different values of immigrant groups.

Later, in the same report, a quite contradictory point was made: "If Britain is becoming a multiracial community the school as a microcosm of the community can be a multiracial society."[18]

At the same time that these conflicting positions were being voiced, the Department of Education and Science in two documents was similarly struggling to develop a position.[19] These documents have been charged with containing assimilationist assumptions, though, as R. Jeffcoate has pointed out, the documents also endorse cultural adjustment, or accommodation, and a kind of guarded integration, which are hardly the same as assimilation.[20]

What is clear is that by 1971 the assimilationist viewpoint (either in its strong or weak forms) that had been guiding policy was abandoned. In rejecting assimilation, the then Home Secretary pronounced a new policy of *integration*, which he defined as "not a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance." Cultural pluralism is now the officially sanctioned ideology that determines policymaking.

A further example of the lack of a clear multicultural policy in education at that time is the policy on dispersal of immigrant children. Dispersal and busing, a liberal policy in the United States, came to be regarded as illiberal, if not racist, policy in Britain. In 1963, following on white parental protests in two primary schools in Southall (which was becoming increasingly an Asian community), the then Minister of Education hurried down to the area and made an *ex-cathedra* statement to the effect that no one school should have more than 30 percent immigrant children; thus began the official dispersal policy. As the Department of Education and Science Circular put it:

> It will be helpful if the parents of non-immigrant children can see the practical measures that have been taken to deal with the problem in the schools, and that the progress of their own children is not being restricted by the undue preoccupation of the teaching staff with the linguistic and other difficulties of immigrant children.[21]

No attempt was made to justify dispersal on educational grounds, no definition of an immigrant was given, but an

identification of immigrants as "problems" was made. The dispersal policy was as much a panic reaction to appease the anxieties of the whites as were government immigration policies. In the end an irresistible combination of white suburban fears about protecting the schools, coupled with black community leaders not wanting dispersal for community reasons, meant that only one or two local authorities actually adopted such a policy.

By the end of the 1960s a major report entitled *Colour and Citizenship* concluded as follows on the performance and policies of the Department of Education and Science:

> Little or no thought has been devoted to a clear analysis of the nature and extent of the educational needs of the immigrants... official policy gave the impression of having been devised under the pressure of circumstances and on received ideas.... The policy makers' main concern was to minimise disturbance to the normal.... The expressed fear was that class teachers would devote too much time to immigrants at the expense of non-immigrant pupils. The school's role in the process of integration was seen as a social one: it would train immigrants to be British, and provide a location where they could mix with English children.[22]

The 1970s

An example of the unholy tangle that government departments got themselves into can be seen in the policy for collection of statistics on the numbers of ethnic minorities, their distribution, and the number of their children in schools. Any special provision for the educational needs of such children was handicapped throughout the 1970s and early 1980s by the fact that no one knew the numbers of children they were dealing with. The problems of definition were accompanied by fears of ethnic minority groups that data would be used for discriminatory purposes and by complaints from teachers unhappy with the collection procedure. In 1973 the collection of statistics was abandoned but ten years later the first tentative steps were being taken to reinstate the procedure.

If there is one area in which success can be claimed it is in the area of second language teaching. Language, of course, is essential to achieve the goal of assimilation that was

dominant at the time. It was, interestingly, the one area where governments took initiative from as early as 1963 when they made constructive recommendations to Local Education Authorities and schools for handling this issue. Policies for the establishment of immigrant reception centers, withdrawal classes, language courses for teachers, and curriculum materials were all proposed and implemented. However, they were aimed at non-English speaking children—Asians, Cypriots, and Chinese. The extent to which Creole impairs progress of West Indian children was not recognized until the early 1970s.

By the 1970s the language problem had been reversed. The demand by minority groups to retain their own language was followed in 1975 by a draft directive of the European Economic Community that children of migrant workers receive instruction in their mother tongue. This directive brought into debate the issue of pluralism in language and cultural identity. The Department of Education and Science was reluctant to agree to this directive, claiming that such a need did not apply in Britain as it did in Europe. Some concessions have since been made and greater cultural sensitivity has been shown to Asian children's needs. However, Creole dialects are still regarded as poor English, and the recent assertion of Creole by West Indian pupils in school is regarded as defiance by many teachers.

In short, there has been progress in the English and second language area. Certainly, children appear to be showing greater mastery of classroom instructional English. At the same time, mother tongue needs, or respect for other dialects and forms of natural speech, have hardly been fostered at all in schools, nor is there much evidence that mastery of higher order skills to reach the highest levels of performance has been obtained.

The main debate of this period, which was touched on earlier, centered around the question of whether immigrant children from deprived homes should be singled out for special consideration over and above the indigenous working-class child. Following a report by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Race Relations, the Department of Education and Science issued a White Paper in 1974 that quite explicitly rejected singling out "immigrant" children from all those who suffered from educational disadvantage and also rejected the recommendation for the establishment

of a special fund to meet the educational needs of immigrant children and adults.[23] The White Paper, in addition, established the Educational Disadvantage Unit at the Department of Education and Science and a Center for Educational Disadvantage whose task it was to draw together research and to disseminate good practice.[24]

By the end of the 1970s the position of the West Indian community was causing deep disquiet among increasingly alienated young black people. Several factors contributed to their concern: an over-representation of black pupils in educationally subnormal schools; the rejection of West Indian children by the schools; the harassment of blacks by the police on the streets, and the increasing number of young people unemployed as the economy moved into recession.

In 1978 the first concession to them was made by the Department of Education and Science when it said that there were special needs of ethnic minorities and that they should be addressed with the help of a special fund. In 1979 the Department established an inquiry into the education system and its effect on the achievement of ethnic minority children with special reference to children of West Indian origin.[25] When that report was published in 1981, the Conservative Government delayed distribution and asked for its chairman's resignation, allegedly on the grounds that it overemphasized West Indian underachievement in terms of teacher and school racism.

Achievement of Ethnic Minority Children in Schools

Throughout the 1970s it was becoming apparent that children of immigrant parents were performing less well than the children of indigenous parents. The studies conducted in the Inner London Education Authority make for particularly depressing reading. In a series of inquiries in the late 1960s and in the 1970s it emerged that:

(1) At the end of primary schooling, New Commonwealth immigrants had a reading age at least one year below the national norms for the age group.

(2) Children of immigrants who had received all their education in English primary schools were found at age 11 (in tests conducted over a three-year period in Verbal Reasoning, English, and Mathematics) to be underrepresented in the top quartile and to be performing half as well as

should have been expected, and half that which indigenous children achieved.
(3) Of the two main groups who received all their education in the United Kingdom, Asian children appeared to be doing as well as indigenous children.
(4) At ages 8+, 10+, and 15+ the gap in mean reading scores between West Indian children and indigenous children from unskilled working-class backgrounds, themselves the most disadvantaged group of the indigenous population, continuously widened.[26]

The Rampton Report confirmed those trends and from a survey of nine local authorities found that:
(a) 3 percent of West Indian children compared with 18 percent of Asian children and 16 percent of other school leavers obtained five or more Ordinary level passes (normally taken about the age of sixteen).
(b) 2 percent of West Indian children compared with 13 percent of Asian children and 12 percent of other school leavers obtained one Advanced level pass (usually taken about the age of eighteen).
(c) 1 percent of West Indian children compared with 5 percent of Asian children and 4 percent of other school leavers were enrolled in full-time degree courses in further education.
(d) 17 percent of West Indian children compared with 19 percent of Asian children and 22 percent of other school leavers obtained no graded results at all.

It is extremely difficult to explain this level of underachievement. The Rampton Report listed a number of factors, including lack of preschooling facilities; inappropriate curriculum, teaching materials, and examination syllabuses; poor school and community relations; and unintentional racism in teachers (reflected in low expectation of students). At a theoretical level, there is no shortage of explanations ranging from "Jensenism," "culture shock," "culture deficit," insecure self-identity, to "cultural dissonance" between white teachers and black pupils. None of us is short of diagnosis, but we are less sure of how to remedy the situation, and indeed we are all still relatively ignorant on both the content and processes of teaching as they affect both black and white children.

The West German Experience

Useful inferences can be drawn by comparing the British and West German experiences of the education of the children of immigrant workers. Of course, there are major differences in the school systems of the two countries, and the *gastarbeiter* who migrated to Germany was always considered to be a short-term migrant. However, a series of concessions have allowed those who have been legally employed for 5 years, or legally resident for 8 years, or married to a German citizen, to stay, and after 10 years of good behavior, they may obtain citizenship. In fact, many of the *gastarbeiters* stayed and in 1978, 28 percent of all immigrants were under seventeen years of age.[27]

As in Britain, West Germany had to make a hurried and often *ad hoc* response to new circumstances. The response was most similar in the policy of assimilating foreign children into educational institutions. The 1971 Standing Conference of Education Ministers came up with the following proposals:

(1) Foreign children should not form more than one-fifth of any class.

(2) Foreign children who first came of school age after entry to the Federal Republic should attend German schools with German children from the outset.

(3) Children with language difficulties should attend preparatory classes for no more than one year and, after special assistance in German, should enter normal classes.

(4) Compulsory schooling should apply to those youths attending vocational schools, those with "on the job" training, and those under eighteen who are unemployed.

As in Britain the avowed aim of West German education is that of equality of opportunity. However, as R. Rist has pointed out, "it is hard to detect a basis for equality of opportunity in a system that is hierarchical and selective, bent on the formulation of an intellectual elite, and organized to produce many 'losers' and few 'winners.'"[28] Further, argues Rist, by pursuing the aim of integration the policy is creating severe problems of identity and marginality for *gastarbeiter* children who have continuously to move between two worlds.

A further view voiced by Castles is that the "catastrophic underachievement in education serves the interests of

employers and government because it helps keep the second generation of immigrants in the lowest stratum of the working class."[29]

According to this thesis, educational provision is predicated on the assumption that the "guestworker's child must be prepared for an eventual return home, but also enabled to become economically active labour. Education thus complements other policies that are aimed to create a permanent immigrant population." Therefore the educational disadvantages of these children, reflected in underattendance at school, underachievement and underrepresentation in the upper levels of selective education, combined with discrimination, confines the new generation to the underclass their parents formed.

Whether this economic explanation can equally apply to Britain is open to question, but it remains true that at a practical level German teachers are no more trained to teach these children than are British teachers. Education suffers from a lack of special teaching materials, and the children are concentrated in the old, overcrowded schools of the inner city.

Schooling in Black and White

What are the children of immigrant parents getting from being educated in Britain in the early 1980s? The decentralized system of education and the high level of autonomy given to schools and to teachers in their classrooms make generalizations difficult. What one observes does not give rise to confidence but, undoubtedly, there is more sensitivity, awareness, and experiment than there was a decade ago; even so, it does not amount to much when set against the scale of the problem. Some local education authorities have pursued a positive policy on multiracial education while others have taken very few steps in that direction at all. Even where authorities have been active, there is still a very wide gap between policy aspirations and school and classroom practice. The teaching profession as a whole is a conservative one and on this issue is particularly resistant to change despite all the recommendations, circulars, and guidelines that have appeared. There can be little surprise at this, given the poverty of teacher preparation for such work and the restricted in-service programs available to them.

Ethnic minority children are caught in a trap. On the one hand, they get equal access to education, and on the face of it this should offer the same equality of opportunity as it does to white children. However, as they are concentrated in inner urban schools and in districts deemed to be deprived, they become, as S. Tomlinson has argued, "not simply a minority presenting problems against a background of white normality. Their problems will be *the* problems of the school and the schools will be the major contact between black children and white society."[30] Equality of opportunity may exist, but because of the location of schools and the identification of black children as problems, the temptation has been to offer them a different type of education than that offered in white suburban schools. Equality of outcome is not being achieved, and preparation for sitting for external examinations is less than that offered to the white child. The irony is that the liberal multicultural curriculum is increasingly seen by some observers as reducing the opportunities of the black child and is therefore meeting with growing opposition from black children, black teenagers, and the community.[31]

The second difficulty is that though the children are benefiting from the professional skills of teachers, the teachers themselves are uncertain on a number of scores. The first is their reluctance to come to terms with changing the curriculum, either through directly teaching about race relations and other cultures or through modifying the traditional subject areas. Confusion has existed in the bodies charged with bringing about curriculum change, and on two occasions the Schools Council has vetoed the publication of research projects that they commissioned and that may have had the effect of changing the curriculum. In areas having large numbers of ethnic minority children, the attitudes of teachers range from honest endeavor to try and do something through bewilderment, arising from not knowing what is expected of them, to outright hostility, arising from the changed nature of the classrooms and the growing problems of learning and lack of discipline. Some see multicultural education as subversive, and some see it as one more idea foisted on them by specialist advisors and outside bodies. At the end of a wearying day, it does not remain high on most teachers' lists of priorities.

The third difficulty lies in the unintended consequences of

policies aimed at reducing disadvantage. The programs, policies, and funds to deal with areas of multideprivation are valuable but they in no way ease the fears of white families that one of the causes of their disadvantage is the presence of black families. Nor for that matter do they make much impact on the difficulties faced by ethnic minorities that need help beyond that provided for all disadvantaged sections of the community. The effect of these policies has been to raise West Indian and Asian parents to the level of disadvantaged sections of society, but what they are looking for is equality of access to *all* social positions for their children.

The fourth difficulty is that there is the danger of treating all children of racial minorities in schools as though they were a homogenous group. The needs of Asian children and those of West Indian children are not the same. Asian children who are doing as well as white children appear to take an instrumental view of education and present fewer discipline problems. West Indian children, on the other hand, are performing poorly in schools and have behavior problems. Coming from a culture that has been systematically downgraded, their attempts to create a symbolic identity through dress, music, and language are often regarded as defiance.

Finally, there is the deeply worrisome fact that there has been a substantial increase in acts of violence against ethnic minorities in many communities, many of which go unreported and undetected. Asian and West Indian children have been singled out as scapegoats by such organizations as the National Front, whose propaganda has been aimed at young white people in inner city schools. Schools are struggling to come to terms with this growing intergroup hostility, for it is in the schools where the definitions of social reality are formed from which the emerging social structures take root.

Conclusion

The evolution of Britain into a multiracial society has been marked by ambiguity in policy that has been both welcoming, recognizing the inevitability and desirability of the development, and resistant (and sometimes racist). Education has been caught in the dilemma posed by these

countervailing views. It has, most of the time, paid lip service to the goals of multiracism while being less than positive in its pursuit.

If the policies of the 1960s and 1970s can be characterized at all, they can be seen to be the years of *resistance* to innovations that could assist the search for a multiracial society through education. The first reason for this resistance can be traced to the belief that the political ends of a multiracial society somehow undermine the tasks of transmitting the national culture and socializing the children into having common sentiments. Unable to ignore the legitimate claims of ethnic minority groups to promote their own cultural identities and to obtain access via education to economic and political power, the policymakers vacillated and resisted. But are minority aspirations and national goals mutually exclusive? Is there not a sense in which the call for a national identity is overstated? There is no single monolithic identity shared by all Britons, for images and values interlock and the experience of one group, as defined by class, region, ethnicity, and gender, is not the same as that prevailing in other groups. For policy makers to hide behind such arguments as national identity is to demonstrate either their fear that such an identity would be eroded, or, as likely, their reluctance to see multiracial groups coexisting in society. Little evidence exists to support the assertions that a decent and fair multiracial society need be lacking in shared values, identity, or patriotism or that its sovereignty would be endangered.

The 1960s offered every opportunity to aid the process of multiculturalism. Those were the years of optimism in education: the economy was buoyant; comprehensivization of secondary schools was proceeding rapidly, higher education was being expanded; the educational problems of the disadvantaged were recognized; and there was much experiment in classroom practice and teacher education. But when the time was ripe, the resistance was greatest. Now, in a decade of economic depression and pessimism, falling school rolls, education budget cuts, unemployment, concern over standards, and the rise in racial tension, the resources necessary to create a multicultural society have lessened although the need for multiculturalism is all the greater. And, paradoxically, as educators have become less resistant to the idea of positive multiracial education, resistance to it

has arisen among leaders inside the black communities. They argue that schools function to perpetuate inequalities and injustice in a capitalist and racist society; that multicultural education diverts the school from its true function of providing skills and knowledge by being overly concerned with therapy and the search for culture, identity, and self-concept. Finally, they argue that multicultural education serves the interests of the state by appeasing white liberal opinion while at the same time defusing black resistance.

British political culture until the late 1960s was distinguished by a consensus in which pragmatism balanced out emotional commitment to principle and polite acquiescence to activist participation. That consensus has crumbled at the edges but still remains intact despite the polarization that has occurred as a result of the Thatcher administration's policies. However, without a more energetic attack on inequality generally and race relations in particular, it is doubtful if the consensus can remain much longer. Black mobilization and its resistance ideology is an indication of the collapsing consensus. The surprise is that the black communities have been patient for so long.[32]

Endnotes

1. Reported in *The Guardian*, 24 October 1977.

2. The term ethnic minorities is used in the British context to cover such culturally diverse groups as Poles, Italians, Jews, Asian and West Indians, and a case could be made to extend it to both the Scots and the Welsh. The focus of this paper is on racial minority groups, expecially on the West Indians and the South Asians—Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis—because their color makes them the target of prejudice.

3. See, for example, J. Power, "Western European Migrant Workers," *Minority Rights Group Report*, 28 (1976); C. Kindelberger, *Europe's Post War Growth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); A. Markovitz and K. Marfrass, "Class Conflict, Capitalism and Social Democracy—The Case of the Migrant Worker in the FRG," *Comparative Politics* (1978); T. Rees, "Immigration Policies in the United Kingdom" in *The Politics of Migration Policies*, D. Kubatt (1979); and P. Braham "Migrant Labour in Europe," Unit 3 *Ethnic Minorities and Community Relations* (The Open University) 1982.

4. See A.D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

5. G. Ben-Tovim and J. Gabriel, "The Politics of Race in Britain, 1962-79," *Sage Race Relations Abstract*, 4, no. 4, (1979).

6. S. Hall, *Policing the Crisis* (London: MacMillan, 1978) 25.

7. K. Middlemas, *Politics in Industrial Society* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979).

8. The Immigration Act of 1971 introduced the idea of patrilineality. Briefly, patrials are citizens of the United Kingdom by birth, registration, or naturalization: born of parents one of whom was a United Kingdom citizen or whose grandparents had citizenship; citizens of the United Kingdom and the colonies and resident for 5 years or more; and spouses of patrials, providing he or she is a citizen.

9. Michael and Ann Dummett, "The Role of Government in Britain's Racial Crisis," in *Justice First* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969).

10. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 1980/81, *5th Report* (London, HMSO).

11. The Government Reply to the *5th Report* from the Home Affairs Committee on Racial Disadvantage, Cmnd 8476, 1982.

12. G. Myrdal, *The American Dilemma* (New York: Harper and Row, 1944).

13. I take institutional racism to mean the practices that, whatever the intentions of the people involved, have the *effect* of systematically disadvantaging particular groups. The term highlights the processes which create or perpetuate racial disadvantage, rather than seeing racism as an individual phenomenon.

14. The Report on the Brixton Disorders (*The Scarman Report*), Cmnd 8427, 1981.

15. U. Prasha, *The Observer*, 29 November, 1981.

16. First presented in this way in March, 1982.

17. See J. Rex and S. Tomlinson, *Colonial Immigrants in a British City* (London: Routledge, 1979).

18. Home Office, *Second Report on Commonwealth Immigrants* (London: HMSO, 1964).

19. Ministry of Education, *English for Immigrants* (London: HMSO, 1964).

20. R. Jeffcoate, *Ethnic Minorities and Educational Policy 1960-1980* (Open University, 1982).

21. E. J. B. Rose, *Colour and Citizenship* (Oxford, 1969).

22. Department of Education and Science, *Circular 7/65.*

23. *Department of Education and Science, Educational Disadvantage and the Needs of Immigrants* (London: HMSO, 1974).

24. The Center for Educational Disadvantage was closed in 1979 by the Conservative Government in order to save money by axing a number of "quangos" (quasi-governmental organizations).

25. Committee of Enquiry into the Education of Children of Ethnic Minority Groups (The Rampton Report), *West Indian Children in our Schools* (London: HMSO, 1981).

26. A. N. Little, "Performance of Children from Ethnic Minority Backgrounds," *Oxford Review of Education* 1, 2 (1975).

27. S. Castles, "The Social Time-Bomb: Education of an Underclass in West Germany," *Race and Class* 21, no. 4 (1980).

28. R. Rist, "On the Education of Guestworker Children in Germany: Public Policies and Equal Opportunity," *Comparative Education Review* 23 (1979).

29. S. Castles, "Social Time Bomb."

30. S. Tomlinson, "Education in Black and White," (Paper read at the British Sociological Association, 1978).

31. See for example, M. Stone, *The Education of Black children in Britain* (London: Fontana, 1981); C. Mullard, *Racism in Society and Schools*, Occasional Paper 1 (University of London Institute of Education, 1980); and F. Dhonay, "Teaching Young Blacks," *Race Today*, June, 1978.

32. I am indebted to colleagues on the E354 Course Team at the Open University for many of the ideas in this paper.